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BRIDGING THE EMPATHY GAP: EFFECTS OF BRIEF MINDFULNESS TRAINING ON
HELPING OUTGROUP MEMBERS IN NEED

By: Daniel R. Berry, M.A.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017.
Major Director: Kirk Warren Brown, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Psychology

Witnessing others in need can be felt similarly to experiencing it oneself (empathy) and
motivates assistance of those in need (prosocial action). It is well-documented that empathy can
occur automatically, but when those in need are not members of a social ingroup, empathy and
prosocial action are undermined. One major ingroup—outgroup division in American and in
other countries is based on race. Although most condemn racial discrimination, empathy and
prosocial action are often lower, however unintentionally, in interracial contexts. In light of this
empathy gap, it is important to identify psychological factors that could bolster empathy and
prosocial action toward racial outgroup members in need. This dissertation asked whether
mindfulness training – cultivating present-centered, receptive attention to one’s ongoing
experiences –increases social sensitivity toward racial outgroup members, and is based on pilot
research indicating that a brief mindfulness induction increased empathy and prosocial action in
such contexts.
Healthy, self-identifying White women were randomized to either a brief (4-day)
mindfulness training or a structurally-equivalent sham mindfulness training. Pre-post

electroencephalographic measures of empathy toward video stimuli of outgroup members
expressing sadness was assessed via prefrontal alpha frequency oscillations (i.e., frontal alpha
asymmetry). Pre-post scenario-based spontaneous prosocial action toward Black individuals in
need, and pre-post 14-day ecological momentary assessment (EMA) of empathy and prosocial
action toward Black individuals (and other races) were conducted. Mindfulness training was
expected to increase EEG- and EMA-based empathy toward Black individuals in need, as well as
increase prosocial action toward such individuals in scenario and daily life (EMA) contexts.
Opposite of what was hypothesized, MT reduced post-intervention empathic simulation,
relative to ST, as measured by frontal alpha asymmetry. Consistent with hypotheses, however,
MT increased empathic concern for outgroup members expressing sadness during video stimuli
observation, and increased post-intervention scenario-based prosocial action. However, the
hypothesis that MT would predict increases in pre- to post-intervention daily EMA-based
prosocial action was not supported. Providing somewhat convergent evidence, trait mindfulness
predicted more frequent pre-intervention scenario-based and daily prosocial action toward
outgroup members; trait mindfulness was not related to pre-intervention video-based EEG and
self-reported empathy outcomes. Together these results suggest that mindfulness can enhance
some indicators or empathy and prosocial behavior in interracial contexts. Mechanisms and
implications of the findings are discussed.

Introduction and Review of the Literature
Ultimately, peace is… about attitudes, about a sense of empathy, about breaking down
the divisions that we create for ourselves in our own minds and our hearts that don’t exist
in any objective reality, but that we carry with us generation after generation. (Obama,
2013)
Intergroup conflict has had a devastating impact on societies and cultures throughout
history, contributing to more than 210 million deaths in the 20th century, 170 million of which
were civilian deaths (Cohen & Insko, 2008). At the heart of this issue, perceiving psychological
separateness between “us” and “them” is psychological kindling for intergroup neglect,
prejudice, discrimination, and full-blown aggressive conflict (Cikara, 2015). Social and political
movements have inspired popular, scholarly, and scientific interest in ameliorating intergroup
tension, and as a means to this end, social psychological approaches converge on identifying and
cultivating psychological factors that bolster prosocial attitudes and actions across social and
cultural lines (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Kelman, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998). Specifically,
scientists have identified several factors successful in fostering intergroup prosociality including:
(1) considering future interactions with outgroup members (Axelrod, 2006; Insko et al., 1998,
2001), (2) cultivating intergroup trust (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005), (3) recategorization of individuals into a superordinate group (Sherif, 1988; Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, &
Wildschut, 2008), and most germane to the present study, (4) cultivating empathy for the
outgroup (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Malhotra, 2005; Shechtman & Basheer, 2005; Stephan &
Finlay, 1999).
Empathy entails sharing and understanding others’ emotions (Tomasello, 2009). When
predicaments befall others, humans express an innate and learned capacity to empathize with
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them and to show them kindness and care (de Waal, 2008). Perhaps in part because seeking and
maintaining long-lasting social relationships is a basic psychological need (Deci & Ryan, 2000),
empathy is often expressed unintentionally and even toward strangers (Preston & de Waal,
2001). Empathy is a proximal promoter of prosocial action (Davis, 2015), behavior intended to
ameliorate others’ suffering. Yet contemporary examples abound of individuals failing to
empathize with and help others in need. Although most condemn discrimination and endorse
egalitarian attitudes, intergroup contexts are frequently marked by an “empathy gap” in which
empathy and prosocial action are less frequently expressed toward outgroup members (Cikara,
Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). Consistent with this, Decety and Chaminade (2003) suggest that
before empathic responses can be made a person in need must first be perceived to be “like” or
“similar” to a prospective helper. Researchers have suggested that rather than creating
interventions that focus on simply increasing empathy, interventions could reduce or eliminate
failures of empathy and prosocial action by reducing the perceived psychological distance
between members of one’s social ingroup(s) and outgroup(s) (Zaki & Cikara, 2015). Implicit to
the promotion of empathy and the prosocial actions that follow is the quality of attention paid to
the person with whom one is interacting (Goleman, 2015). Further, Barrett-Lennard (1981)
pointed out that an “empathic attentional set” is necessary for successful intergroup interactions,
in which one “opens him- or herself in a deeply responsive way to another person’s feelings” (p.
92).
But how does one “deeply” attend to the other? Despite theoretical perspectives asserting
the importance of attention in empathy and prosocial action (Latané & Darley, 1970), a relative
paucity of empirical studies has examined attentional quality in these domains. Mindfulness
offers particular promise in the study of intergroup prosociality, for several reasons. First,
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mindfulness entails a heightened capacity for careful – one could even say, unconditional
(Chödrön, 2000) – attention to internal and external stimuli from moment to moment (Baer,
2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003). A growing body of research from the cognitive sciences indicates
that gains in sustained attention, executive attention, and other indicators of well-functioning
attention capacities accrue with mindfulness training (MT; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007;
Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008; Slagter et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007; van den Hurk,
Giommi, Gielen, Speckens, & Barendregt, 2010). Second, MT fosters a temporary suspension
(or at least a greater awareness) of automatic thoughts, emotions, and behaviors (Analayo 2003);
as I will soon discuss, automaticity is one factor that hinders prosociality, particularly when it
involves unquestioned identification with a social group or category (Tajfel, 1982). Third, there
is initial indication that MT has positive social, including prosocial consequences (Condon,
Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno, 2013; Rosenberg et al., 2015). Fourth, training in mindful
attention may be more transferable to social contexts than other attention training methods (Tang
& Posner, 2009). Finally, nascent research has shown that brief MT, as well as variation in
dispositional mindfulness, the tendency to deploy mindful attention in one’s daily life, can
promote prosocial emotions and actions toward ostracized strangers, dissimilar others, and racial
outgroup members (Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017; Berry, Brown, et al., 2017). Therefore,
mindfulness provides a fitting lens through which to examine the role of attentional quality in
intergroup prosociality. With this research as background, rigorous research is now needed to
examine the role of MT on intergroup prosociality with active, structurally-equivalent control
conditions in a randomized controlled trial (RCT). To address this, the present study pitted 4day MT against a structurally-equivalent sham meditation training (ST), both slightly adapted
from Zeidan and colleagues (Zeidan et al., 2011; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, &
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Goolkasian, 2010; Zeidan, Johnson, Gordon, & Goolkasian, 2010). The overarching purpose of
the study was to understand whether training in mindfulness can increase empathy and prosocial
action toward racial outgroup members. A comparison to ST was designed to help distinguish
the effects of relaxed breathing and placebo influences (e.g., the belief that one is meditating)
from the actual practice of mindfulness.
The present research builds upon findings from Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) and others
that examined the influence of outgroup status (defined by race) on an electroencephalographic
(EEG) indicator of empathy. Recent research on the ‘mirror neuron system’ (Rizzolatti, Fadiga,
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) reveals that humans ‘match’ others actions, emotions, and mental
states by merely observing them as they engage in these behaviors and psychological states.
Several researchers have postulated that EEG indicators, including mu rhythms and frontal alpha
asymmetry frequency oscillations, are modulated by mirror neuron somatosensory inputs during
emotion and action observation (e.g., Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & Martineau, 1999; Gutsell &
Inzlicht, 2012; Holz, Doppelmayr, Klimesch, & Sauseng, 2008; Keuken et al., 2011; Lepage &
Théoret, 2006; Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004; Oberman, Pineda, &
Ramachandran, 2007; Perry et al., 2010; Pineda, 2005). Moreover, recent research has linked
these EEG indicators to higher levels of trait empathy (Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, &
D’Esposito, 2010) and to performance on emotional empathy tasks (Pineda & Hecht, 2009). Of
interest to the present research is the widely-studied asymmetry in the alpha band of the EEG
frequency spectrum, which indexes differences between left and right prefrontal cortical
activation essential for information related to reward and punishment (Davidson, 2004). Early
research found that higher activity in the left (relative to the right) prefrontal cortex is associated
with approach-related emotional states and traits, including happiness and anger; and that higher
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right (relative to left) prefrontal activation is associated with avoidance-related emotional states
and traits like fear and sadness (Davidson, 2004; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010).
More recently, Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) found that self-identifying White individuals
evidenced higher right frontal alpha asymmetry scores while observing video stimuli of racial
outgroup actors expressing sadness, relative to observing White actors expressing sadness. This
effect was exacerbated by racial prejudice against Black individuals, as measured by the
Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (Henry & Sears, 2002), and appears to reflect lower ‘matching’ of
emotional states with racial outgroup members. The present study attempts to extend the
findings of Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) by understanding the role of MT, relative to ST, in
attenuating the empathy gap in an interracial context, as indexed by higher right frontal alpha
asymmetry scores among White adult participants, a neural marker of psychological ‘matching’
or empathizing with others’ sadness (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012) – in the present study, racial
outgroup (Black) individuals.
Another goal of this research was to examine whether MT, relative to ST, increases
prosocial action (i.e., helping behavior) of White participants toward Black individuals. This
study aims to extend the findings of Condon et al. (2013), who showed that MT increases the
frequency of scenario-based helping behavior toward strangers. This study also seeks to extend
the results of Berry, Cairo, et al. (2017), which showed that those scoring higher in dispositional
mindfulness provided more frequent scenario-based helping of racial outgroup members in need.
Similar to empathy, helping behavior is often lower in interracial contexts (Saucier, Miller, &
Doucet, 2005). The present study will extend this research by examining MT-induced pre-post
changes in scenario-based helping behaviors (cf., Condon et al., 2013; Latané & Dabbs, 1975);
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in doing so the magnitude of the pre-post changes in prosocial action can be separated from
dispositional proclivities for prosocial action.
In addition to the proposed laboratory-based measures of empathy and prosocial action,
end-of-day ecological momentary assessment (EMA; Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008) of
empathy and prosociality will be captured pre- and post-training; specifically, empathic concern
– an emotion congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need (Batson et al., 1987) and a
proximal promoter of helping behavior (Davis, 2015) – will be measured. Second, end-of-day
EMA indicators of helping behavior frequency (Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012) will
assess helping behaviors toward Black individuals (and racial ingroup and other racial outgroup
members) in need. These end-of-day measures have been previously used to capture
spontaneous prosocial action toward strangers and acquaintances (Morelli, Rameson, &
Lieberman, 2014) and this study will extend these results by querying about the race and
ethnicity of the individuals that were helped.
I anticipate that MT, relative to ST, will begin to close the empathy gap in interracial
contexts, as indexed by front alpha asymmetry in response to video-recorded expressions of
sadness by Black actresses (Primary Aim 1). Further, I predict that MT, relative to ST, will
increase the frequency of helping behavior toward Black individuals (and other racial
outgroups), as indexed by EMA recording (Primary Aim 2). In the sections that follow I provide
a rationale for these aims before detailing the study in which I propose to examine the effects of
MT, relative to ST, on empathy and prosocial action in intergroup contexts. First, I will discuss
briefly social identity theory (SIT) and in more detail the attendant psychological consequences
of group membership in intergroup contexts, namely reduced empathy and prosocial action
toward outgroup members. Thereafter, I will describe simulation theory, a social neuroscience
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approach to empathy; this section will integrate simulation theory with SIT by describing
intergroup deficits in empathy. After discussing the neuroscientific and behavioral consequences
of social group membership I describe how mindfulness that may help to enhance prosociality in
intergroup contexts. Finally, nascent research will be presented showing that mindfulness can
attenuate defensive attitudes and reduce prosocial emotion and action toward outgroup members.
Intergroup Cognition and Emotion: Underpinnings of The Empathy Gap
Belonging to a cohesive social group has its benefits, not the least of which that group
membership is necessary to one’s survival (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). Membership in
cooperative groups allows for reciprocal exchange of food and other tangible resources, provides
potential mates and protection from threat, and promotes the dissemination of cultural values and
knowledge (De Dreu, Balliet, & Halevy, 2014). Furthermore, group membership fosters
psychological and social well-being (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Although the benefits of
group membership are legion, feeling that one belongs to a group is typically accompanied by
less willingness to cooperate with, empathize with, and help those who do not belong (Cikara et
al., 2011) and can even foster neglect of, and/or aggression toward social outgroup members
(Tooby & Cosmides, 2010).
As social beings, individuals are embedded within the broader worldviews of their social
and cultural groups, these worldviews reflecting values, ideals, and beliefs about the world and
the role of the individual and social groups within it. Group identity valorizes ingroup members,
encourages reciprocal exchange and trust, and provides a source of shared meaning among
members of the ingroup (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). But
conflict and tension arise when this shared meaning is threatened or attacked. Contemporary and
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historical examples abound of individuals and groups derogating or aggressing against rival
groups when they threaten ingroup worldviews and social identity.
Social Identity Theory and Reduced Prosociality toward the Outgroup
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1974; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) is based on the
supposition that categorizing oneself into a group is a sufficient and necessary first step toward
ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict. The theory distinguishes between personal identity,
which entails how people think and feel about their unique traits, and social identity thusly:
Tajfel (1981) defines social identity as “the part of an individual’s self-concept which derives
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and emotional
significance attached to that membership” (p. 255). Brewer (2001) continues: “social
identification involves affective and evaluative processes that are above and beyond cognitive
classification. The affective significance arises from the felt attachment between the self and the
ingroup” (p. 21). Only when one incorporates the group into their social identity can intergroup
neglect and tension arise.
SIT posits that individuals are motivated to enhance and maintain self-esteem by
achieving positive ingroup distinctiveness - the tendency to perceive one’s social ingroup as
distinct from and better than other outgroups (Tajfel, 1982). Even among individuals assigned to
“minimal groups” that are created on an arbitrary basis (in the lab, for example), distinctions are
made between “us” and “them” and are especially exaggerated when they favor the ingroup
(Tajfel, 1978). Favoring one’s ingroup(s) promotes positive interactions among ingroup
members, but can also have detrimental downstream consequences to the harmony of intergroup
relations. “Privileging members of our group, by correlation, de-privileges those who do not
belong to it” (Ricard, 2015, p. 277). We perceive members of our ingroup(s) to be
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heterogeneous and thus worthy of careful attention; outgroup members are perceived as
homogenous, and we often neglect their psychological complexity (Haslam, 2006), relying on
cognitive shortcuts about their traits, goals, intentions, and behaviors to inform the social
interaction (Park & Judd, 1990). This neglect of outgroup complexity is exacerbated and
maintained by (a) the belief that groups are essential; (b) members of groups all have something
underlying in common that distinguishes them from other categories; and (c) social categories
are viewed as biological categories, akin to differences between species (Rothbart & Taylor,
1992).
Empirical evidence from social psychology and social neuroscience on the disregard of
outgroup members’ psychological states consistently supports the foregoing theoretical accounts
of SIT, suggesting the presence of an empathy gap for outgroup members. Importantly, this
psychological disregard occurs in processes necessary for the promotion of empathy. Evidence
from fMRI research indicates that individuals perceived to be low on both competence and
warmth (e.g., homeless individuals and those addicted to drugs) are perceived as “disgusting”
and “less than human” (so-called “extreme outgroups”; Harris & Fiske, 2006). It has been
shown that all social group members except those from extreme outgroups elicit activation in the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a brain region associated with social cognition abilities
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Stimuli depicting extreme outgroup members
also produced greater activation in the insula and amygdala, areas associated with disgust
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). But outgroup members do not need to be viewed
as extremely low on competence and warmth to be neglected. For example, in a study described
to participants as “exploring learning about groups,” Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham (2008)
randomly assigned self-identifying White participants to one of two novel groups dubbed the
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Leopards or Tigers. Participants then completed a learning task while lying in an fMRI scanner
in which they associated face stimuli of other ostensible participants into one of the two “big cat
groups”. Group membership was indicated simultaneously with the presentation of the face
stimuli. Face stimuli were of 12 Black and 12 White individuals, and 6 stimuli of each race were
assigned to one of the big cat groups to rule out the possibility that sociodemographic factors
(and not the arbitrary group assignment) produced any neural differences between the group
assignments. During a second phase of the experiment, participants were presented the same
face images but with group membership identification removed. Results showed lower
activation in neural areas associated with positive emotional processing, including the amygdala,
fusiform gyri, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsal striatum when viewing outgroup members’ faces,
relative to ingroup members’ faces. These results are important in the context of the present
study, as interracial interactions are often unintentionally marked by a lack of positive emotion
(Cikara, 2015). Thus, it is not merely that outgroup members are unfavorably regarded; social
interactions with strangers are often positive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) but this positive
emotion appears to be bounded by social ingroup status.
An abundance of research on outgroup neglect also shows deficits in the recognition of
outgroup members’ emotional states. A meta-analysis of emotion recognition across cultural and
social lines found an ingroup advantage of emotion recognition in facial expressions within
nations, regions, and cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). When others’ emotions are
recognizable, individuals react less strongly to the emotional expressions of racial outgroup
members (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008), and lower activation in the neural pain matrix is
evidenced when witnessing racial outgroup members in physically painful contexts (Xu, Zuo,
Wang, & Han, 2009) and emotionally painful contexts (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010).
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Being a fan of a particular sports team presents a strong ingroup—outgroup division among fans
of rival teams. Attenuated responses in the neural pain network are associated with lower costly
helping (offering to take the place) of rival soccer fans receiving shocks and also increased
neural activation in the nucleus accumbens (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010), a
neural structure associated with states of pleasure and Schadenfreude (Cikara et al., 2011;
Cikara, 2015). Avenanti, Sirigu, and Aglioti (2010) demonstrated empathy deficits toward Black
Italians among White Italians in sensorimotor contagion, a corticospinal response that is
automatically activated during physical pain observation.
Deficits in empathy and helping behavior toward outgroup, relative to ingroup members
are not necessarily consequences of innate motivation to favor the ingroup; rather, such deficits
appear to be culturally learned (Chiao & Mathur, 2010). Higher self-reported racial prejudice
predicts lower sensorimotor cortex activity, which is necessary for mimicking and understanding
the behavior of others (de Waal, 2008) and for empathizing with them (Pineda, 2005), in
intergroup contexts and specifically for culturally disliked groups such as Blacks in Italy
(Avenanti et al., 2010) and South Asians in Canada (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010). Thus, intergroup
empathy and prosocial action deficits may be linked to both innate and learned processes. Taken
together these results suggest that neural indicators of empathy are undermined in intergroup
contexts and appear to be due to culturally learned biases.
In light of the proximal role of empathy in promoting prosocial action (Batson et al.,
1987; Davis, 2015), attenuation of empathy in intergroup contexts should also lead to less
frequent helping behavior. Indeed, recent research (Kunstman & Plant, 2008) and a metaanalysis (Saucier et al., 2005) show that in some contexts people are less likely to help outgroup
members in need than members of one’s social ingroup(s). Specifically, Saucier et al. (2005)
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demonstrated that lower helping behavior toward racial outgroup members is more likely to
occur when the ability to override discriminatory behavior is inhibited by pairing the race of the
person in need with a social context wherein one is expected to help less, namely in contexts
where help is difficult, time consuming, or dangerous; when responsibility to help could be
attributed to other prospective helpers; or when one endorses a prejudiced self-concept (Dovidio
& Gaertner, 2000). In most circumstances, however, racial outgroup helping frequency is
statistically equal to that of ingroup helping.
Simulation Theory: Neural Bases of Empathy
Humans have an innate and learned ability to empathize with and understand the mental
states of other. But how does one come to understand the other? Although many theoretical
approaches to empathy exist, most converge to suggest that before we coordinate social behavior
we first simulate the mental states of others by drawing on our own previous mental and
emotional experiences in similar circumstances (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). The
discovery of the mirror neuron system in monkeys (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, &
Rizzolatti, 1992) and its homologue in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995) has
been the starting point for empirical research and generation of theory to understand empathy
through a neuroscientific lens. Studies of the human mirror neuron system have consistently
shown that every time one observes someone performing an action, we automatically recruit the
same neural motor circuits as when we act out that behavior ourselves (Preston & de Waal,
2001). A now classic finding in social psychology shows that humans unconsciously mimic
postures, behaviors, and facial expressions of strangers (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and in so
doing build social bonds with the other that often lead to helping them (Chartrand & Lakin,
2013; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). Simulation theory (Gallese, 1998)
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similarly suggests that empathy is based on simulating an adversely affected person’s mental
state by activating mirror neuron circuits dedicated to perceiving that state in one’s own body.
Initial findings suggest that neural simulation and behavioral mimicry are part of a family of
downstream responses modulated by activity in the human mirror neuron system (Hogeveen,
Chartrand, & Obhi, 2015).
Depending on circumstances individuals commonly simulate affective and/or behavioral
states of others, and to some extent somatic states can be simulated as well. For example, Singer
et al. (2004) demonstrated that neural circuits that modulate affective responses to one’s own
pain, which include bilateral anterior insula (AI) and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
regions of the brain, are also active when observing another’s pain. However, Singer et al.
(2004) did not find that those observing pain simulated or “felt” the somatic and/or physical
sensations to understand their pain. It does appear that one simulates the affected person’s
emotional distress on the other hand. A recent meta-analysis that included 32 fMRI studies of
empathy for physical and emotional pain provided further support for the contention that
empathy is based on simulating others’ emotional distress, and also provided greater statistical
power than the single aforementioned study (Singer et al., 2004) to test the apparently smaller
effect sizes of simulation of somatic pain (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). The researchers
showed that (consistent with the study by Singer et al. (2004)), activity in the AI and ACC in
response to others’ pain (both emotional and physical) was greater than chance. Inconsistent
with Singer et al. (2004), however, the researchers found that when participants observed
physical pain stimuli (e.g., another person’s hand caught in a door), neural areas specific to pain
sensation in the same part of the observer’s body (e.g., areas of the premotor cortex) were
simultaneously activated; this indicates that at least to some extent, one-to-one mirroring of the
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pain of others is necessary (or at least occurs) in empathy for physical pain. Together these
findings shed light on the positive association between neural simulation and empathy.
Incipient research indicates that neural simulation of even social pain can promote
prosocial action toward individuals in need. Masten, Morelli, and Eisenberger, (2011) recorded
fMRI responses of participants observing another ostensible individual being excluded in an
online ball-tossing game (Cyberball; Williams, Yeager, Cheung, & Choi, 2012). The canonical
version of Cyberball was designed to exclude participants and record concurrent neural and/or
subjective responses to the exclusion; Williams and Jarvis (2006) suggested that this ball-tossing
paradigm could be used for examining behavioral indicators of discrimination in interracial
contexts and empathy for others who were excluded in the game environment. Based on
correlational evidence showing empathy for vicarious exclusion (Wesselmann, Bagg, &
Williams, 2009), Masten et al. (2011) hypothesized that social exclusion would evoke activation
in brain areas involved in the emotional experience of pain (i.e., AI and ACC) and in
mentalizing, or inferring another’s mental state (i.e., percuneus, VPFC, and TPJ). The latter
neural activation was hypothesized on the basis that in the Cyberball environment one cannot
directly see the emotional pain of others as they are being excluded. Thus, understanding the
context itself may serve as a sufficient instigator of empathy. Masten et al. (2011) found
increased activation in the VPFC, precuneus, AI, and ACC in participants observing Cyberball
exclusion. Importantly, activity in these neural regions partially mediated the relation between
trait empathy and prosocial actions, namely the extent to which participants showed kindness and
comfort to excluded individuals in emails later written to them. These results are consistent with
those of Lamm et al. (2011) discussed earlier, as neural areas of the shared pain network and
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neural areas associated with representing or simulating the mental states of others’ emotional
distress predicted greater kindness toward another person.
Reduced simulation toward dissimilar others and outgroup members. The
automaticity (e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002) of neural simulation of other’s physical, emotional,
and social pain notwithstanding, top-down cognitive influences of perceived similarity and group
membership can thwart simulation. Such a phenomenon is not surprising in light of previously
detailed literature that precursors of empathy (e.g., emotion recognition) are often undermined in
intergroup contexts. What is more, intergroup interactions are said to be stilted by an empathy
gap in which empathy is lower (e.g., Cikara et al., 2011) and prosocial actions less likely
(Saucier et al., 2005) than when one is interacting with a familiar other or an ingroup member.
One example of this comes from the research on empathy for social pain. Using the same fMRI
Cyberball paradigm as by Masten et al. (2011), Meyer et al. (2013) found heightened activation
in the shared pain network (AI & ACC) when witnessing a close other being socially excluded,
but witnessing a stranger being excluded activated neural regions associated with thinking about
or imagining the mental states of others (percuneus, TPJ, & VPFC). Thus, empathic simulation
of close others appears to entail direct sharing of emotion, whereas simulation of strangers seems
to entail mentalizing or inferring how the other is feeling. Further, the shared pain network
activation in the close other condition was positively correlated with self-reported closeness, or
connection, felt with the close other. More generally, several phenomena related to empathy,
including the understanding of others’ emotions, appear to involve or be based on perceived selfother overlap, taking into account both neural and psychological evidence (Decety &
Sommerville, 2003; de Waal, 2008; Preston & Hofelich, 2012).
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Beckes, Coan, and Hasselmo (2013) examined statistical associations between neural
areas active while participants received shocks themselves or witnessed either a close friend or
stranger receiving shocks. Associations between self-threat and friend-threat in neural areas that
included the AI were statistically significant, but self-threat – stranger-threat associations were
nonsignificant. This study was one of the first to use neural activation to a pain stimulus that
individuals experienced themselves as a basis for understanding empathic simulation of another
person’s response to the same pain stimulus. These findings are important because they
illuminate the possibility that variation in familiarity with the affected person is a moderator in
the empathic process. Specifically, when one perceives greater overlap between oneself and
another, empathic responses appear to “map on” to or more directly simulate one’s own
experiences of the same event. Several studies have demonstrated greater readiness to simulate
the physical, emotional, or social pain of similar or familiar, relative to unfamiliar, others (Chen,
Lew, Hershman, & Orlander, 2007; Hein & Singer, 2008; Lamm et al., 2011; Singer, 2006).
Electrocortical (EEG) Indicators of Neural Simulation
As previously mentioned, several studies have linked EEG indicators to neural simulation
or human mirror neuron activity (e.g., Cochin et al., 1999; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012; Holz et al.,
2008; Keuken et al., 2011; Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Oberman
et al., 2007; Perry et al., 2010; Pineda, 2005). The most commonly used indicator of neural
simulation is mu suppression, an EEG frequency oscillation within the alpha frequency band (9 –
11 Hz) over central EEG electrode sites (Cochin et al., 1999; Gastaut & Bert, 1954) and is
believed to tap mirror neuron-modulated electrocortical activity in the sensorimotor cortex
(Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1979).
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Mu suppression is elicited in contexts involving motor activity (Pineda, 2005). For
example, participants are typically asked in studies of mu suppression to engage in some motor
activity themselves to form a baseline measure; then each one watches another individual engage
in the same activity. Woodruff, Martin, and Bilyk (2011) implemented a finger-tapping task in
which participants watched videos of others tapping their fingers to their thumbs and then
performing this activity themselves; this motor task elicited mu suppression in both conditions
and differences between self- and other-induced mu suppression scores were negatively
correlated with trait empathy. Tasks involving motor simulation often compare self-generated
mu suppression to other-generated mu suppression, similar to the physical pain empathy task
previously described in Beckes et al. (2013).
In a study designed to test whether interracial interactions could reduce mu suppression,
Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) asked participants to grasp a glass of water placed on a table in front
of them while EEG was recorded. Thereafter, they watched videos of White (racial ingroup),
Black, South Asian, and East Asian individuals (racial outgroup members) performing this same
action during EEG recording. The researchers hypothesized that the White participants would
show statistically different self vs other mu suppression discrepancies in the other-race
(outgroup) condition. They did in fact find that self-generated versus outgroup-generated mu
suppression was significantly different, whereas self-generated versus ingroup-generated mu
suppression was not significantly different. These results indicate that the automaticity of
empathic may be attenuated in response to stimuli depicting outgroup members. However, mu
oscillations appear to be limited to the study of simulation of motor behavior, and are not
modulated by the expression of emotion (Gutsell, 2014), As will be discussed next, alpha
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asymmetry frequency oscillations have been shown to be a more reliable EEG-based indicator of
emotion simulation.
Alpha asymmetry as an indicator of neural emotion simulation. Alpha asymmetry
frequency oscillations represent a recently-recognized indicator of emotional simulation (Gutsell
& Inzlicht, 2012) and are the EEG measure of interest in the present study. Alpha asymmetry is
an EEG-based measure of the relative activation in left and right prefrontal cortices, which are
essential for the processing of reward- and punishment-related stimuli (Davidson, 2004).
Activity in the left prefrontal cortex (PFC), relative to the right PFC, is associated with approachrelated emotions like happiness and anger, whereas right PFC activation, relative to left PFC
activation, is associated with avoidance-related emotions like fear and sadness (Davidson, 2004;
Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). These neural responses have been measured with alpha asymmetry
scores - specifically, left minus homologous right activations over frontal electrode sites
(Davidson & Fox, 1982). Higher right cortical activity, indicated by a negative alpha asymmetry
score, is thought to be indicative of trait-like negative affective styles (Wheeler, Davidson, &
Tomarken, 2007) and can also evoke state negative affect, for example in response to negative
emotional films (Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990). Higher left cortical
activity, indicated by a positive alpha asymmetry score, is also indicative of trait-like affective
styles, but are more often positive in valence (Wheeler et al., 2007); higher left alpha is
associated with approach-related positive affective states like happiness (Gable & HarmonJones, 2008), but it is also associated with negative approach-related states like anger (HarmonJones & Sigelman, 2001). Even though alpha asymmetry is most understood in the context of
one’s own emotional reactivity to evocative stimuli, recent work has shown that alpha
asymmetry is also sensitive to vicarious stimuli of others experiencing emotional pain (Gutsell &
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Inzlicht, 2012). This is because the prefrontal cortices are active during the experience and
expression of emotion and not the perception of emotion (Davidson, 2004). Thus, alpha
asymmetry responses, which are modulated by prefrontal cortical activity, are considered an
index of the experience of vicarious emotion ‘matching’ and not merely the perception of such
matching.
Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) capitalized on this principle of alpha asymmetry by testing
whether observing others express sadness in videos depicting racial outgroup members, relative
to racial ingroup members, would attenuate prefrontal cortical activity associated with simulating
the emotional experience of another person. As in Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010), responses to
racial ingroup and outgroup members expressing sadness were compared to self-generated
expression of the behavior; more specifically, during scalp-recorded EEG assessment
participants were asked to think about a personally sad experience they could vividly remember.
The researchers hypothesized that there would be significant differences in self-generated and
outgroup member-generated right alpha asymmetry responses to sadness, and found this pattern
of results (and did not find differences between self-generated and ingroup-generated differences
in right alpha asymmetry). Self-reported racial prejudice for Black Canadians (Henry & Sears,
2002) showed a positive (but nonsignificant) trend relation to the difference between selfgenerated and outgroup-generated right alpha activation. Moreover, self-reported empathy, as
measured by the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), showed a marginally
significant negative association with the difference between self-generated and outgroupgenerated right alpha activation. Consistent with the research suggesting that empathy is a
facilitating factor in the reduction of outgroup discrimination, these results suggest that those
higher in trait empathy may show a smaller gap between self-generated sadness and simulated
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sadness of outgroup members. Although these moderating effects of racial prejudice and
empathy were nonsignificant, Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) suggested that the smaller sample size
in the study (N = 30) might have contributed to a lack of sufficient statistical power to reject the
null hypotheses.
Summary
The findings presented in these sections, in accord with Social Identity Theory and
Simulation Theory, reveal that belonging to a social group is a starting point for empathic neglect
of (and in some cases conflict with) outgroup members. This neglect is apparent in emotion
recognition deficits (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Furthermore, putatively automatic empathic
processes (de Waal, 2008) that rely on modulation of the human mirror neuron system, and
simulation of an affected person’s mental state (Gallese, 1998), are often undermined in
intergroup interactions (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). Thwarting basic empathic processes evident
in neural simulation could be the basis for more complex deficits in the subjective experience of
empathy and engagement in helping behavior (i.e., the empathy gap; Zaki & Cikara, 2015),
which putatively underlie intergroup aggression and conflict (Cikara, 2015).
The present research asks: how can we begin close the empathy gap between in- and
outgroup members? As previously stated, Barrett-Lennard (1981) suggests that an “empathic
attentional set” in which one “opens [them]self in a deeply responsive way to another person’s
feelings” (p. 92) is required for harmonious intergroup interactions. Social psychologists
(Latané & Darley, 1970) and others (Goleman, 2015) have suggested that paying careful
attention to others is indeed a necessary precondition for empathic processes that can lead to
prosocial action. Perhaps because paying attention to an affected other appears self-evident in
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the empathic process, however, cultivating the quality of attention paid to the other has been
overlooked as a possible determinant of empathy and prosocial action.
Recent research by Berry, Cairo, et al. (2017) showed that both dispositional variation in,
and training of mindful attention may offer a lens through which we can study specifically how
one might pay attention to others to cultivate empathy and prosocial action. Specifically,
mindfulness has been canonically characterized as a quality of receptive attention to what one is
presently experiencing (Anālayo, 2003; Brown & Ryan, 2003), and importantly, nascent research
shows that MT can increase prosocial emotion and action toward others (Condon et al., 2013;
Rosenberg et al., 2015). Drawing upon the centuries-old practice and more recent science of
mindfulness, I propose that the inherent receptivity of mindful attention helps to set the stage for
prosociality across social and cultural lines.
Mindfulness and Intergroup Prosociality
As discussed in the previous sections, simulation theory suggests that individuals
automatically simulate the physical, emotional, and/or social pain of another person. However,
studies from social neuroscience support the postulate of SIT that suggests perceived
separateness between oneself and others (and between “us” and “them”) fosters cognitive and
emotional disregard for the outgroup (Haslam, 2006; Park & Judd, 1990; Tajfel, 1974; 1978,
1982). Empathic simulation is lower toward unfamiliar others (Beckes et al., 2012; Meyer et al.,
2012) and in racial outgroup contexts (Aventati et al. 2010; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Gutsell &
Inzlicht, 2012). What is more, empathic simulation is enhanced when one reports feeling closer
to an individual in pain (Meyer et al., 2012), and is dampened when one endorses racially
prejudiced attitudes (Aventati et al., 2010; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). Thus, these deficits in
empathic simulation (as well as in empathic concern and prosocial action) appear to be a
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consequence of social identification (e.g., Cikara et al., 2011), which fundamentally divides “us”
from “them”. Zaki & Cikara (2015) propose that because the psychological underpinnings of the
empathy gap appear to be based on perceived in/outgroup separateness, identifying
psychological factors that attenuate the perceived separateness between self and others may
catalyze empathy in intergroup interactions.
The interpersonal benefits of mindfulness have been highlighted by the religious and
philosophical traditions from which the concept is derived, which emphasize the importance of
disengaging from the often automatic, self-centered concerns that help to preserve the perceived
psychological distance that separates “us” from “them” and thereby inhibit interpersonal
sensitivity and meaningful connection with others (e.g., Brown, Berry, & Quaglia, 2017; Leary
& Terry, 2012; Trautwien, Schmidt, & Naranjo, 2014). Broadly consistent with this, a recent
meta-analysis found a moderate effect size of MT on salutary interpersonal outcomes (𝑟̅ = 0.44;
Sedlmeier et al., 2012), though studies are still few. In the following sections I discuss how
mindfulness can reduce unintentional biases that often occur outside of our conscious awareness
and that may in turn reduce empathy and prosocial action toward outgroup members. These
automatic biases are a consequence of social identification in particular, a process that has been
shown in previous sections to reduce empathic simulation, empathy, and prosocial action.
Thereafter, I discuss theoretical and empirical evidence for how mindfulness can mitigate the
perceived separateness between oneself and others, which may cultivate (or at least reduce the
social identification processes that dampen) empathic simulation. Finally, I discuss direct
evidence of mindfulness on prosocial emotion and action in intergroup contexts.
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Mindfulness Reduces Automaticity
The capacity to be mindful stands in stark contrast to much of our daily experience, in
which we operate on automatic pilot without much awareness of what we are doing or
experiencing (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). We easily drift into mind wandering (Killingsworth &
Gilbert, 2010) and when provoked or stressed, we often act and react automatically (Kang,
Gruber, & Gray, 2013). In states of automaticity, awareness operates in service to automatic
thoughts, feelings, desires, and behavior.
One example of the pervasiveness of automaticity and its deleterious effects on our social
well-being comes from research on priming. Primes are previously presented stimuli that
activate concepts and influence the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that follow (see Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000 for review). Primes are most impactful when one mistakenly attributes the
downstream consequences of primes to self-generated, volitional thoughts, feelings, judgments,
or behavior (Loersch & Payne, 2011). In a classic demonstration of this, Schwarz and Clore
(1983) phoned participants on either rainy or sunny days to query about their global happiness
and life satisfaction. On average, life satisfaction and happiness were lower on rainy days, but
when participants were asked “by the way, how’s the weather there?” the weather’s effect on the
ratings was less potent.
Mindfulness is thought to allow a clear, moment-to-moment glimpse into what one is
thinking, feeling, or doing, in which events are “seen” without dominance by conceptual thought
(Olendski, 2005). This mindful stance allows one to notice mental processes as they arise, or to
notice the psychological effects of those processes on one’s experience and behavior, and then
slow, interrupt, change, or override these automatic cognitions, emotions, and behaviors.
Levesque and Brown (2007) demonstrated that for those lower in basic dispositional

23

mindfulness, implicit (generally nonconscious) autonomy orientation was significantly positively
associated with day-to-day autonomous motivation; more mindful individuals, however, showed
higher day-to-day autonomous motivation regardless of implicit autonomy orientation. These
results indicate that among those lower in implicit autonomous orientation, mindfulness
tempered the unconscious tendency to associate the self with low volition or choicefulness.
These findings are consistent with mindfulness theory concerning automaticity in showing that a
predisposition toward this state of mind was associated with less automatized, more choiceful
behavior on a day-to-day basis.
Implicit attitudes are based on automatic associations between two or more constructs in
memory (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), and a considerable amount of research in this area has
been conducted on social attitudes and behavior. Coming into contact with a representative of a
social group for which a stereotype schema is present automatically activates attitudes about
them (e.g., Devine, 1989), and these attitudes have a number of often unintended consequences
detrimental to intergroup interactions, ranging from discriminatory hiring decisions (Rudman &
Glick, 2001), to more frequent shooting of ambiguously threatening outgroup members (Correll,
Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Implicit bias, which often influences behavior outside of
one’s awareness, also impacts prosocial actions in interracial interactions. Stepanikova, Triplett,
and Simpson (2011) tested this hypothesis by measuring racial attitudes on the race-based
Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) prior to an opportunity
to engage in generosity toward a racial outgroup member. More specifically participants were
randomized to believe that they were playing the dictator game (Eckel & Hofffman, 1996) with
either a self-identifying White or Black individual. The results indicated that among White
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participants, greater implicit racial bias against Black individuals was correlated with lower
generosity (i.e., monetary donation) to ostensible Black individuals.
Growing research interest in the contemplative science community on attenuating
implicit bias has sparked systematic study of the effects of mindfulness and related meditative
practices on implicit attitudes. Kang, Gray, and Dovidio (2014) demonstrated that non-Black
adults receiving 6-week loving-kindness meditation (LKM) training that incorporated
mindfulness meditation as a basis for cultivating sensitivity toward others (Salzberg, 2011),
relative to those in a loving-kindness discussion group, showed reduced implicit bias against
Black and homeless individuals, as measured by the IAT. Stell and Farsides (2016) found that
among White participants even brief (10-min) LKM afforded lower automatic activation of, and
greater conscious control over implicit racial biases against Black individuals on the IAT. The
latter researchers found that positive emotions toward the outgroup mediated the effect of LKM
on implicit racial bias reduction.
The meditation training in these studies was multimodal in form, including directing
participants in how to be more sensitive toward others, but there is evidence that a mindful state
itself reduces implicit bias. Lueke and Gibson (2015) asked whether deploying mindful attention
could reduce implicit race and age biases. Participants were randomized to receive a very brief
(10-min) mindfulness training or a matched control training prior to completing the race and age
IAT. Results showed that MT decreased implicit race and age bias, presumably because
mindfulness weakened automatically activated associations on the IAT. These studies of
implicit bias suggest an altered form of intergroup interaction that begins with open or receptive
presence to the other.
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Mindfulness reduces social identification. Theory and research also indicate that
mindful attention can reduce social identification (Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017; Berry, Brown, et al.,
2017), an automatic process that categorizes individuals, separates “us” from “them” (Tajfel,
1982), and activates stereotypes about social outgroups (Devine, 1989). As Brown and
colleagues discuss (Brown, et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2008), social identity is a dynamic
construct that involves identification with particular attributes, roles, group memberships, and
worldviews that are consistent with appraisals that one has made over time (Brown et al., 2008;
Gilbert, 2005). The lay view of identity entails that one maintains a coherent and consistent view
of the self that is separate from others (Metzinger, 2003). Interpersonal and intergroup
interactions can be viewed as interactions between self-representations of those individuals that
are mediated by, or filtered through each person’s internalized views of self and other (Brown et
al., 2008; Leary, 2002). When mindful attention is brought to self-representations and other
thoughts as they arise, change, and fade away, the ephemeral nature of such processes can be
“seen”, affording a dis-identification with them (Berry & Brown, in press; Brown, et al., 2016;
Brown et al., 2008). Thus, when mindful, one may be “freer” from the automatic actions and
reactions that drive prejudiced thinking (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989), that is
underlain by perceived separateness between “us” and “them” and reliably reduces empathy and
prosocial action (Cikara et al., 2011; Stepanikova et al., 2011).
As stated earlier, mindfulness has been theorized to help close the psychological distance
between self and others (e.g., Trautwein et al., 2014). If mindfulness fosters dis-identification
from self-representations, then it may also enhance the perceived similarity between self and
others more readily than states of mind marked by inattentiveness to automatically activated
ingroup/outgroup attitudes that commonly arise in intergroup interactions. Thus, if empathy,
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particularly empathic simulation, and prosocial action are promoted by perceived similarity,
mindfulness could be expected to foster empathic simulation and prosocial action in intergroup
contexts. In the next section I turn to nascent evidence supporting this claim.
Mindfulness Increases Empathy and Prosocial Action
Prosocial emotions and actions crucially begin with careful attention to the person in
need (Latané & Darley, 1970). Although implicit in theories of prosociality, quality of attention
is a largely overlooked determinant of prosocial emotion and action. But in prosocial contexts
attention is a nuanced phenomenon, requiring attention to the present situation so as to notice the
person’s predicament, and also “tuning in” to one’s own internal somatic and affective responses
to that situation. The latter quality of attention (so-called interoceptive awareness) is thought to
be the basis for understanding another’s predicament and their emotional and mental states
(Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). Thus, carefully attending to one’s own internal
responses as they arise could provide a starting point for empathic simulation.
A recent cognitive neuroscience approach to empathy and prosocial action suggests that
developing interventions to cultivate empathy be geared to engaging attention so as to “tap into”
pre-existing dispositions or “sources” of empathy (i.e., the ReSource model; Bolz & Singer,
2013). Specifically, these authors suggest that empathizing with others is based on (a) attending
receptively to the affected person, (b) taking their perspective, and (c) attending to one’s own
emotional and mental states that arise and that are based on one’s previous experiences in similar
circumstances. Bolz & Singer (2013) further posit that practicing mindfulness may offer an
optimal psychological approach to cultivate all three of these capacities, because mindful
attention is inherently receptive to both external and internal stimuli. When attention to such
stimuli offer the opportunity to simulate the affected other’s mental state, the receptive nature of
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mindful attention may allow for clearer understanding of the other without presupposition of
their experience based on stereotypical thought.
Nascent theory and research supports the contention of the ReSource model that states of
mindfulness optimize capacities necessary for the cultivation of empathy that leads to prosocial
action. First, mindfulness has been characterized as unconditional (Chödrön, 2002) and
equanimous (Desbordes et al., 2015) attention to what one is presently experiencing. Thus, a
state of mindfulness could be an exemplar of the attentional receptivity that is needed to cultivate
empathic simulation. Second, dispositional mindfulness has been associated with higher trait
perspective taking (Beitel, Ferrer, & Cecero, 2005), and MT has been shown to increase trait
perspective taking (Birnie, Speca, & Carlson, 2010). Third, MT has been shown to enhance
interoceptive awareness (Bornemann, Herbert, Mehling, & Singer, 2015). Most importantly, and
perhaps as a consequence of cultivating these three factors described in the ReSource model, MT
promotes empathy (Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017); Rosenberg et al., 2015) and prosocial action
toward strangers (Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017); Cameron & Fredrickson, 2015; Condon et al., 2013;
Lim, Condon, & DeSteno, 2015) – these being individuals who are often shown fewer
kindnesses than shown toward “known” others. In light of these findings suggesting that MT
promotes interoceptive awareness and that MT attenuates social identification processes that
reduce empathy and prosocial action toward outgroup members, I propose that these prosocial
benefits should extend into intergroup interactions.
Preliminary evidence for this proposition has been gleaned from three experiments by
Berry, Brown, et al. (2017), in which participants were randomized to listen to a very brief (10minute) audio-recorded MT or a structurally-equivalent attention control training, or to receive
no instruction, and then witnessed a person with a dissimilar personality (Study 1) or race
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(Studies 2-3) being ostracized (excluded) in an online ball-tossing game (Cyberball; Williams,
Yeager, Cheung, & Choi, 2012). Relative to those in the control conditions, MT participants
reported higher empathic concern for the victim (and lower empathic anger toward the
perpetrators). MT participants also wrote more comforting emails to the victim and included
them more often during a later ‘all play’ Cyberball game. Empathic concern mediated the effect
of MT on helping behavior outcomes, suggesting that a state of mindful attention fostered more
empathy and subsequently, more helping behavior.
The Present Research
To reiterate, in interracial interactions there is a reliable empathy gap between racial inand outgroup members (Cikara et al., 2011; Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Zaki & Cikara, 2015).
This empathy gap can be seen in lower empathic simulation, attenuated neural responses to
sadness stimuli (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012), and in less frequent prosocial action (e.g., Saucier et
al., 2005). Contemplative scholars have long emphasized the role of MT in prosociality
(Davidson & Harrington, 2002) and such training may confer prosocial emotions and actions by
reducing psychological boundaries between self and others (Brown et al., 2008; Brown et al.,
2016; Leary & Terry, 2012; Trautwein et al., 2014). Mindfulness appears to reduce implicit
racial biases (Lueke & Gibson, 2014) that can inhibit prosocial action (Stepanikova et al., 2011).
Mindfulness also appears to reduce self-oriented social identification (e.g., Brown et al., 2016)
that attenuates outgroup emotion recognition (Elfenbien & Ambady, 2002), empathy (e.g.,
Cikara et al., 2011), empathic simulation (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; 2012), and prosocial action
(Saucier et al., 2005). In addition, brief MT has been shown to promote empathy and prosocial
behavior (Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017); Cameron & Fredrickson, 2015; Condon et al., 2013; Lim,
Condon & DeSteno, 2015; Rosenberg et al., 2015). Finally, initial evidence suggests that
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mindfulness promotes empathy and prosocial behavior in interracial contexts (Berry, Cairo, et
al., 2017). This research provides a rationale for the present study aims examining the effect of
MT, relative to ST, on empathy and prosocial action in interracial interactions.
In the present randomized controlled trial, I attempted to extend this prior research
showing that mindfulness can increase empathy and prosocial action toward others by asking
whether adult White participants randomized to a 4-day MT or to a structurally equivalent ST
would show increased intergroup empathic simulation and empathic concern, and a greater
frequency of prosocial action toward Black individuals. Training-related change in empathic
simulation was assessed with right frontal alpha asymmetry scores in pre- and post-training lab
sessions in response to video stimuli depicting ingroup (White) and outgroup (Black) members
expressing sadness, and in comparison to self-generated sadness (cf., Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012).
In addition, a commonly used self-report measure of state empathy (Batson et al. 1987) assessed
pre-post training changes in empathic concern for the individuals in the video; measures of
personal distress and empathic sadness (Batson et al. 1987; Batson et al., 1991) – two emotions
that are less reliably associated with prosocial action (Davis, 2015) – were also included in prepost sessions to test the specificity of the mindfulness – empathic concern relation. Regarding
prosocial action, two previously used scenarios that are designed to elicit such action (Condon et
al., Latané & Dabbs, 1975) served as lab-based in vivo indicators of helping behavior frequency
toward Black individuals. These scenarios were counterbalanced in pre-post training sessions.
I also used pre-post training EMA-based measures of in vivo prosocial action to address
“real world” social benefits of MT. Specifically, prosocial actions were assessed using an endof-day checklist of prosocial action toward strangers and acquaintances (Rameson, Morelli, &
Lieberman, 2012). To extend this research I also queried about the sociodemographic
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characteristics of the individuals that were helped (i.e., race, gender, and perceived income), and
to conceal study aims these prosocial actions were embedded among other common positive and
antagonistic behaviors that a person may engage in with strangers and acquaintances. This
study focused on White female graduate students (and some female community adults); graduate
students were a targeted convenience sample that has shown high retention rates (> 90%) in a
similar study of brief mindfulness training (Quaglia, 2016). Female graduate students were
chosen to control for possible self-presentation differences between males and females in
empathy contexts (Jones & Pittman, 1982).
Primary Aims
Figure 1 displays the two proposed primary study aims to be tested.
Primary aim 1. The first primary aim addressed whether MT, relative to ST, provided to
self-identifying White or Caucasian female adults increases empathic simulation with and
empathic concern for Black individuals expressing sadness. I tested the following specific
questions:
•

Question 1.1. Does MT, relative to ST, produce greater pre-post increases to
empathic simulation toward Black individuals in need as measured by right
frontal alpha asymmetry scores in response to sadness video stimuli?

•

Question 1.2. Does MT, relative to ST, produce greater pre-post increases in
empathic concern (but not personal distress or empathic sadness) toward Black
individuals in need as measured by reported empathic concern in response to
sadness video stimuli?

Primary aim 2. The second primary aim asked whether MT, relative to ST, increases
interracial prosocial action. I tested the following specific questions:
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•

Question 2.1. Does MT, relative to ST, produce greater pre-post increases in
laboratory scenario-based helping frequency toward Black individuals?

•

Question 2.2. Does MT, relative to ST, produce greater pre-post increases in endof-day EMA-based helping behavior frequency toward Black individuals (and
other racial outgroup members)?
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Figure 1. Study primary aims 1 and 2.
Notes. Level 3 = between training condition; Level 2 = between persons; Level 1 = repeated measures (within persons)
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Secondary Aims
Secondarily, the present study attempted to better understand the role of dispositional
mindfulness, the tendency to deploy mindful attention in daily life (Brown & Ryan, 2003), in
predicting empathy and prosocial action in interracial interactions. One commonly used
individual difference measure of dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) was used to
examine the predictive role of trait mindfulness on the pre-intervention study outcomes detailed
in the primary aims. To examine the incremental predictive validity of trait mindfulness, racial
prejudice against Black individuals (Henry & Sears, 2002), social dominance orientation (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), trait empathy (Davis, 1983) and trait agreeableness (Costa
& McCrae, 1992) were controlled. The secondary aims are detailed as follows (see Figure 2).
Secondary aim 1. The first secondary aim of the present study asked whether
dispositional mindfulness predicts greater self-reported empathic concern and right frontal alpha
activity to outgroup sadness stimuli measured at baseline. I examined the following specific
questions:
•

Secondary Question 1.1. Does self-reported dispositional mindfulness predict
greater empathic simulation (as assessed by right frontal alpha activity) to
outgroup sadness video stimuli assessed at pretest?

•

Secondary Question 1.2. Are these Question 1.1 relations maintained when
controlling for self-reported trait empathy, agreeableness, and racial prejudice
toward Black individuals?

•

Secondary Question 1.3. Does dispositional mindfulness predict greater selfreported empathic concern (but not empathic sadness and empathic distress) to
outgroup sadness video stimuli assessed at pretest?
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•

Secondary Question 1.4. Are these Question 1.3 relations maintained when
controlling for self-reported trait empathy, agreeableness, and racial prejudice
toward Black individuals?

Secondary question 2. The second secondary question aimed to extend the findings of
Berry, Cairo, et al. (2017; Study 1), to address whether dispositional mindfulness at pre-test
predicted increased frequency of interracial helping behavior. I examined the following
questions:
•

Secondary Question 2.1. Does dispositional mindfulness predict greater
frequency of helping Black individuals in scenario-based helping behavior?

•

Secondary Question 2.2. Are these Question 2.1 relations maintained after
controlling for trait empathy, agreeableness, and racial prejudice toward Black
individuals?

•

Secondary Question 2.3. Does dispositional mindfulness predict greater
frequency of helping Black individuals (and other racial outgroup members)
in end-of-day helping behavior?

•

Secondary Question 2.4. Are these Question 2.3 relations maintained after
controlling for trait empathy, agreeableness, and racial prejudice toward Black
individuals?
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Figure 2. Study secondary aims 1 and 2.
Notes. Level 2 = between persons; Level 1 = repeated measures (within persons).
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Method
Sample size determination
Previous studies of the effects of brief MT on empathy and helping behavior in
intergroup contexts show medium effect sizes (d = 0.53 – 0.62; Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017).
Power analysis for multilevel model statistical approaches was conducted using Optimal Design
Software (Spybrook, Raudenbush, Liu, Congdon, & Martínez, 2006). Assuming a medium
effect size of d = 0.50, = 0.05, and 1 −  = 0.80, a sample of N = 80 (training ns = 40) was
shown to be required for sufficient power to reject null hypotheses if training condition
differences do exist. In a recent study by Quaglia (2016), high retention rates were shown using
a similar 4-day MT (97%) and a structurally-equivalent control (96%) and in the same target
population. Assuming a conservative 90% retention rate, I attempted to over-recruit an
additional 4 participants per condition (N = 88).
Participants
Seventy-nine self-identifying White, Caucasian, or European American women from the
Richmond community, and graduate students and from Virginia Commonwealth University
(VCU) completed all study measures. Graduate students (n = 75) were recruited via emails sent
through VCU-hosted graduate student and staff listservs (see Appendix A). Community
members were recruited through word-of-mouth (n = 4). Study advertisements described an
opportunity to participate in a study on mindfulness meditation in exchange for a free course in
mindfulness meditation and $110 compensation. Participants were excluded via email-based
screening (see Appendix B) prior to provision of informed consent on the following bases:
history of (a) neurological or (b) psychiatric illness, (c) lack of access to a personal computer at
home, (d) previous experience with mindfulness meditation, (e) under the age of 18 or over the

37

age of 60, and/or (f) self-identifying as any race other than White, Caucasian, or European
American (g) self-identifying as any gender other than woman. These last two exclusion
criterion were not advertised in recruitment emails so as to conceal the aims of the study that are
associated with race. Older adults (i.e., older than 60 years of age) were excluded from the
present study on the basis that stranger and acquaintance interactions steadily decline throughout
adulthood (Carstensen, 1992), and decline steeply after the age of 60 (Lansford, Sherman, &
Antonucci, 1998) when many adults begin to retire from work.
Procedure
After checking exclusion criteria via email screening, each participant reported
individually to a laboratory in the VCU Department of Psychology. An experimenter greeted
participants upon arrival and led them into a waiting room where two confederates were seated
in two of three chairs. The experimenter asked the participant to be seated while he or she
prepared the experiment rooms. After the experimenter left the waiting room to ostensibly
prepare for the study, each participant was randomized to receive one of the two following
scenarios: (1) a Black experimenter returns and ostensibly accidentally dropped a large stack of
informed consent documents on the floor (modified from Latané & Dabbs, 1975), or (2) another
ostensible Black participant walked into the waiting room on crutches and leaned uncomfortably
against the wall (cf., Condon et al., 2013). In these scenarios, prosocial action was assessed as
helping the experimenter pick up the dropped papers and offering one’s seat to the individual on
crutches, respectively. Importantly, the two confederates in chairs served as bystanders who did
not react to the predicament of the individuals in need of help. This number of bystanders, and
their aloof reaction are two factors shown to reduce prosocial action toward anyone (Darley &
Latane, 1968) and racial outgroup members in particular (Saucier et al., 2005). Two scenarios
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were chosen as a means to conceal study hypotheses so that participants were not confronted
with the same scenario at pre- and posttest sessions; they were counterbalanced withinparticipants pre-post training. Appendix C shows pilot study results (Berry, Brown, et al., 2017)
on the prediction of helping frequency in these two scenarios by dispositional mindfulness.
After scenario-based interracial prosocial action assessment, participants were escorted
into the EEG testing room. Participants were informed that the study was examining the effects
of meditation on everyday social interactions, given informed consent (see Appendix D), and
completed an initial questionnaire (see Expected Benefits of Intervention Questions; Devilly &
Borkovec, 2000). Then participants were fitted for a 64-channel EEG cap (Geodesics, GES
400). During EEG recording participants observed eight video stimuli of individuals expressing
sadness (four White and four Black individuals; see Appendix E for stimulus validation
procedures). The videos were each 20 seconds in duration and depicted one young Black or
White female adult expressing sadness while sitting in a chair behind a regular height table and
in front of a blank white background. After watching each video participants completed state
measures of empathic concern, empathic distress (Batson et al., 1987), and empathic sadness
(Batson & Shaw, 1991) (see State Empathy Measures). The videos were presented in random
order without replacement (within-subjects; see Figure 3). Following sadness video observation,
participants were instructed to express sadness themselves. Participants were instructed to think
of a sad event in their life that they could remember vividly, and were then instructed to emote
(but not visibly so as to control for muscle artifacts) on two successive occasions for 40 seconds
while recollecting the event; there was a one-minute break in between emoting occasions (cf.,
Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). The two sadness video conditions (same-race and other-race) and the
self-generated sadness condition comprised one, within-subjects factor (self-other distance; 0 =
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ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self) across which alpha asymmetry scores were compared. At the
end of each self-generated sadness condition participants completed a self-report measure of
their emotional state while emoting (see State Emotion Measures).
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Figure 3. Stimulus presentation order during EEG-recording.
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After removing the EEG cap, participants were trained on how to complete end-of-day
EMA-based measures (see End-of-day Measures), and given opportunity to ask questions about
the study. Participants were instructed to record spontaneous social interactions that occurred
with strangers and acquaintances, and were told to refrain from recording social interactions at
work that were required to perform their job. Following EMA training, participants were
randomly assigned to either MT or ST. The experimenters were blind to condition assignments.
Participants were then thanked and dismissed.
Figure 4 shows the study procedure timeline. Following an initial 14-day, end-of-day
EMA-based recording of helping behavior, participants reported to either MT or ST training
sessions on three consecutive days (see Interventions). At the end of each training session
participants filled out a brief questionnaire querying the belief that they were meditating. After
three days of MT or ST were completed the participants reported back to the lab where scenariobased prosocial action was assessed. Then the fourth MT or ST session was completed in the lab
prior to EEG assessment and end-of-day EMA-based refresher training. After a second, 14-day
EMA-based helping assessment identical to the first one, participants reported back to the lab for
compensation disbursement and debriefing. Participants were then thanked and dismissed.
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Figure 4. Procedure of study activities by day in the study.
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Psychological Trait Measures
Mindfulness. The 15-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan,
2003: Appendix F) tapped the frequency of mindful states in daily life on a 6-point Likert scale
(‘almost always’ to ‘almost never’ Higher scores indicate higher mindful attention deployment.
Empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; Appendix G) assessed
trait empathy on a 5-point Likert scale (‘does not describe me well’ to ‘describes me very well’).
The 7-item fantasy subscale assessed the tendency to adopt the point of view of fictional
characters. The 7-item empathic concern subscale assessed felt sympathy or compassion for
suffering others. The 7-item personal distress subscale assessed emotional discomfort in the
presence of others’ distress or suffering. The seven-item perspective taking subscale assessed
the tendency to adopt others’ points of view.
Agreeableness. The 12-item agreeableness personality dimension subscale of the NEOFFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Appendix H) assessed agreeableness on a 5-point Likert scale
(‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Higher scores on the scale indicate greater
agreeableness.
Racial prejudice against Black individuals. The 8-item Modern Racism Scale (Henry
& Sears, 2002; Appendix I) assessed racial prejudice on a 4-point Likert scale (one item is on a
3-point Likert scale). Because most individuals endorse egalitarian attitudes, and will not
explicitly endorse racially prejudiced attitudes, the measure combines prejudiced statements with
those that convey perceived social and political justice. Higher scores on this measure indicate
higher racial prejudice against Black individuals.
Social dominance orientation. The 16-item Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO;
Pratto et al., 1994; Appendix J) assessed the extent to which one feels positively or negatively
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about statements that endorse inequality among social groups on a 7-point scale (‘very negative’
to ‘very positive’; example item: “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.”)
Higher scores indicate greater preference for inequality among social groups.
State Empathy Measures
Using a 7-point Likert scale (‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’), six adjectives tapped empathic
concern: sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, and softhearted. Seven adjectives
tapped personal distress: alarmed, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed, and troubled
(Batson et al., 1987). Seven adjectives assessed empathic sadness: sad, dejected, sorrowful, lowspirited, downhearted, heavyhearted, and feeling low (Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). These
measures are shown in Appendix K.
State Emotion Measures
Twenty-four adjectives from five subscales, sadness, fatigue, serenity, fear, and guilt, of
the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded form (PANAS-X; Watson &
Clark, 1994; see Appendix L) were administered immediately after recollection of a sad
autobiographical event (self-emoting) during EEG recording. Responses were made on a 5-point
Likert scale about the extent to which the person in the video expressed the following emotion or
psychological state (‘very slightly or not at all’ to ‘extremely’). When responding to these items
participants were asked to express how they felt during self-emoting.
Expected Benefits of Intervention Questions
Appendix M shows the 6-item Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly &
Borkovec, 2000) that was administered immediately following training condition assignment to
control for differences in the expected benefits of the interventions. Items include “At this point,
how logical does the course offered to you seem?” (9-point Likert scale; ‘not at all logical’ to
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‘very logical’), and “At the end of this course, how much improvement in your personal wellbeing do you think will occur?” (11-point Likert scale; ‘0%’, ‘10%’, ‘20%’... ‘100%’).
Electrocortical Recording and Pre-processing
Continuous EEG was recorded using 64 sintered Ag/AgCL electrodes mounted in an
electrode net (Geodesics, GES 400). Electrodes were based on the international 10-10 system
with a CPz ground, and referenced to Cz. Signals were amplified, filtered with a 60 Hz notch
filter, and digitized at 1000 Hz. Signals were manually scored for artifacts, with regressionbased eye movement correction applied (Semlitsch, Anderer, Schuster, & Presslich, 1986); 2.048
second epochs were extracted through a Hamming window, and then a fast Fourier transform
extracted power within the alpha band (8—13 Hz).
Alpha asymmetry indices were created for homologous electrode sites (natural log right
minus natural log left scores). Because alpha power is inversely related to cortical activity,
higher scores will indicate greater left than right alpha activity (Davidson, 2000). Homologous
sites included medial frontal (F1/2, F3/4) and lateral frontal (F5/6, F7/8) electrode sites.
End-of-day EMA-based Measures
Stranger and acquaintance interaction checklist. For 14 consecutive days, pre- and
post-training, participants were emailed at 5pm with a link to a survey (REDCap; Harris et al.,
2009), where they were instructed to complete the survey immediately prior to going to bed in
the evening. Daily helping was measured with a 12-item yes/no checklist that included the
following helping behaviors (Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014): gave directions; helped
someone with technology; delayed elevator; held open a door; made change; picked up a fallen
object for someone; lent or gave money; let someone go ahead of you in line; helped a disabled
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or elderly person; lent an item of value (tool, clothes, car, etc.); helped someone with
schoolwork; and asked someone if they needed help.
Fifteen undergraduate research assistants pilot tested this checklist, and to conceal the
specific aims of this study, which focused on helping behavior, research assistants were asked to
report on pleasant (non-helping) interactions and antagonistic interactions with strangers and
acquaintances in day-to-day life for fourteen days. These responses were open-ended, allowing
participants to comment on all stranger and acquaintance interactions they had on a particular
day. Common positive (non-helping) interactions included: introduced yourself; verbally
greeted someone; non-verbally greeted someone (e.g., waved, smiled, made eye-contact); and
made conversation. Common antagonistic behaviors included: ignored or avoided someone;
made an aggressive gesture at someone; and disagreed with someone; felt good about
someone’s misfortune; cut a conversation short. These additional 9 items were randomized with
the 12 original helping checklist items (see Appendix N) in the present research.
Situational and subjective end-of-day measures. For each interaction behavior that the
person checked, the following situational questions were asked: (1) “please indicate the number
of times you engaged in this specific activity today” (with the option to report up to 7 times), (2)
“where were you when the interaction took place?” (forced choice; Work, School, Home,
Traveling, Shopping, Church, Gym, On the Street / Sidewalk; Restaurant, Park, Other), (3)
“what time of day did the interaction take place” (forced choice; Morning, Afternoon, Evening),
(4) “please indicate who you interacted with.” (forced choice; Stranger, Acquaintance), (5)
“what was the race of the primary person with whom you interacted” (forced choice; White,
Black, East Asian, etc.). Participants also indicated (6) “what was the sex of the primary person
with whom you interacted” (forced choice; male, female), and if multiple interactions involving
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the same behavior were indicated, these questions (excluding question 1) were answered about
each corresponding behavior that occurred that day.
Interventions
Two conditions underwent 3 consecutive days of training for 20 minutes each day. A
fourth day training, also 20 minutes in duration, was held at the beginning of the final lab session
(cf., Zeidan et al., 2010, 2011). Groups included 5 – 10 participants, each of which met in the
same room at the same time of day.
Mindfulness training (MT). MT was modeled on basic Vipassana (focused breathing)
meditation training (Zeidan et al., 2011; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, et al., 2010; Zeidan,
Johnson, Gordon, et al., 2010). Training was conducted by a person experienced in mindfulness
meditation training and naïve to the study hypotheses. Participants were told that the meditation
practices used in this intervention were secular in nature, associated with no religious teachings.
Unlike other secular MT interventions, such as the popular 8-week Mindfulness-based Stress
Reduction program (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982), participants were instructed to refrain from
practicing mindfulness meditation outside of the regular 4-day meeting time to control for
individual variations in the frequency of mindfulness practice during treatment.
In session 1, participants were instructed to close their eyes and relax and then to focus
on the flow of their breath (Wallace, 2006). If a random thought was aroused they were
instructed to notice and acknowledge the thought and to “simply let it go” by bringing attention
back to the breath. In session 2, participants were instructed to focus on the full breath
sensations in the nostrils, chest, and abdomen. The last 7 minutes of sessions 1 and 2 were held
in silence as the participants practiced what was taught that day. Sessions 3 and 4 were
extensions of Session 2, with the last 13 minutes devoted to silent practice in Session 3, and
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nearly the full 20 minutes devoted to silent practice in Session 4 (facilitated by the first author).
As a manipulation check participants responded to the yes/no question “did it feel like you were
meditating?” at the conclusion of each session. Participant questions about meditation were
fielded by the instructor before the conclusion of each session.
Sham mindfulness training (ST). The purpose of the ST was to provide a very closely
matched control condition to examine whether non-mindfulness-based breathing exercises and a
placebo effect (the belief that one is meditating) affect outcome variables (cf., Zeidan et al.,
2010). A different facilitator, matched for sex, education level, and years of group leadership
experience, conducted the training. Specifically, both facilitators were male, have earned
master’s degrees (in social work and in teaching for MT and ST facilitators respectively), and
had more than five years of group leadership (7 years teaching meditation and 6 years leading
positive youth development groups for MT and ST facilitators respectively). Participants were
introduced to ST in the same manner as to MT. As conducted by Zeidan et al. (2010), each
session of ST was based on breathing exercises. Participants were told every 2—3 minutes to
“take deep breaths as we sit in meditation.” Time spent giving instructions was matched to MT
for each of the four sessions. This intervention differed notably from MT, as MT includes
instruction in both focused attention and meta-awareness (letting go of random thoughts that
occur during practice). As in MT, the fourth ST session was facilitated by the first author, who
is male, had earned a master’s degree in experimental psychology, and had 7 years of teaching
experience at the university level; this fourth session was identical to the fourth MT laboratory
session. Given that nearly the full 20 minute fourth session was devoted to silent practice, the
instructions were identical as participants were already familiar with the exercises in the
interventions. In addition, delivering the same instructions allowed the first author to be blind to
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the participant’s intervention assignment. At the conclusion of each session participants
responded to the same manipulation check question as in the MT sessions. The instructor fielded
questions before the end of each session.
Data Analysis Plan
Prior to data analysis, univariate and multivariate normality was checked. Skewness and
kurtosis was examined for all self-report and EEG-based measures. Skewness and kurtosis
values that exceed +/- 1.50 were considered in violation of normality, and outlier scores were
examined in frequency tables. Outliers higher than the 97th percentile and lower than the 3rd
percentile were winsorized (Dixon & Tukey, 1968) – that is, replaced by the next highest or
lowest value, respectively, to remedy skewed and/or leptokurtic or platykurtic distributions.
To account for the nested structure of the data, 3-level and 2-level multilevel linear mixed
(MLM) models with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML; Bryk & Raudenbush,
1992) were constructed using SAS PROC MIXED (Singer, 1998) for models using continuous
outcomes (i.e., alpha asymmetry scores and self-reported state empathy measures). Three-level
models were used in tests of primary study aims that examined continuous outcomes
comparisons between interventions (level 3), between subjects (level 2), and within subjects
(repeated-measures; level 1). All 2-level models examined the effects of psychological traits
between subjects (level 2) and within subjects (repeated-measures; level 1; e.g., self-other
distance) on pre-intervention continuous outcomes. SAS PROC GLIMMIX was used to
construct multilevel mixed models predicting dichotomous helping behavior in scenario-based
helping. Because daily helping frequency is a count variable, which may contain a
preponderance of zero counts, procedures used for fitting multilevel zero-inflated Poisson mixed
models were performed first using SAS PROC GENMOD and then SAS PROC NLMIXED
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(Veronica, Egede, & Gebregziabher, 2014). Veronica et al. (2014) argue that it is not possible to
fit zero-inflated Poisson models in PROC GLIMMIX or PROC MIXED, and testing
zero-inflated Poisson models in SAS PROC NLMIXED often fails to converge. One reliable
solution to this problem is fitting so-called “baseline parameter estimates” for all main effects
and interactions using SAS PROC GENMOD using a zero inflated Poisson distribution.
Thereafter, these baseline parameter estimates are entered as starting values in SAS PROC
NLMIXED to assist with model convergence, and allow modeling of random effects, which is
not possible using PROC GENMOD (Veronica et al., 2014). The optimal variance-covariance
structure of each model was identified by comparing the −2 log likelihood (-2LL; a goodness of
fit index) across unconditional means models; unstructured, variance components, Toeplitz, and
first-order autoregressive variance-covariance structures were compared. As shown in Figures 1
and 2, separate MLM models were tested to address research questions concerning the main
effects of intervention, dispositional mindfulness, and self-other distance (i.e., actress race; same
race vs. other race) in sadness video stimuli on the primary study outcomes (i.e., scenario-based
helping frequency; end-of-day assessed helping frequency and empathy; and self-reported
empathic concern and alpha asymmetry scores in response to sadness video stimuli).
Intervention (0 = ST, 1 = MT), self-other distance (0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self,), and
EEG channel pair (0 = F1/F2, 1 = F3/F4, 2 = F5/F6, 3 = F7/F8) were identified as categorical
variables in all MLM models.
Results
Preliminary Analyses and Manipulation Checks
Two participants’ post-intervention scores were removed from analyses, as postexperimental inquiry revealed suspicion about study procedures. The remaining 79 pre-
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intervention and 77 post-intervention outcome scores were included for further analyses. MT
included (n = 41) at pre-intervention assessment and (n = 40) at post-intervention. ST included
(n = 38) at pre-intervention assessment and (n = 37) at posttest. All continuous variables were
checked for univariate and multivariate normality. Also, all participants indicated that they
thought they were meditating regardless of intervention type (all ‘yes’ responses to the “did it
feel like you were meditating?” question administered at the end of each training session). Table
1 shows descriptive statistics for all psychological traits measured at baseline. Several of these
trait measures were intercorrelated, but most importantly intervention (0 = ST, 1 = MT) was
weakly positively correlated with racism and weakly negatively correlated with empathic
concern. It is expected that randomization equalizes participant variables across groups. But the
use of a randomized controlled trial design in this study focuses on change, and thus, initial
scores are less important. Age was not related to study outcomes (ps > 0.41) so was not further
considered. Also noteworthy, there were no training condition differences in expected benefits of
the intervention (ps > 0.51).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate relations among baseline trait predictors and training
intervention.
Variable

1

1. MAAS

−

2. NEO-A

0.48**

3. MRS

0.10

−0.10

−

4. SDO

0.14

−0.13

0.36**

−0.15

0.12

5. IRI-FS

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

−

−0.24*

−
−0.25*

−

6. IRI-PT

0.28*

0.33** −0.12

−0.07

0.29**

7. IRI-EC

0.16

0.29** −0.26*

−0.33**

0.51**

8. IRI-PD

−0.21

0.03

−0.20

0.19

−0.08

0.14

9. INTVN

0.02

−0.01

0.25*

−0.01

−0.12

−0.19

−0.24*

0.01



0.82

0.61

0.74

0.91

0.80

0.68

0.83

0.80

M

3.54

3.97

1.95

1.73

24.30

25.99

26.52

18.44

SD

0.66

0.52

0.30

0.71

5.60

3.89

3.77

4.99

−0.13

−
0.53**

−
−

Notes. INTVN = (intervention; 0 = ST, 1 = MT); MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale;
NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern Racism Scale; SDO = Social
Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; FS = Fantasy subscale; PT =
Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD = personal distress;
Significant training relations highlighted in bold.
*p ≤ 0.05, **p < .01

Video Observation Task Results
Does recollection of autobiographical events produce sadness? Self-induced sadness
was included as a baseline to compare frontal alpha asymmetry scores for ingroup and outgroup
video observation. To ascertain whether recollection of a sad autobiographical event elicited
sadness, emotion intensity (sadness, guilt, fear, serenity, and fatigue) during the self–induced
sadness task was compared using repeated measures ANOVA in SPSS (v24). There was a
significant difference in reported intensity of these five emotions at pre-intervention, [F(1, 77) =
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42.12, p < 0.01]. Post hoc analyses using Bonferonni correction showed that sadness (M =
3.416, SD = 0.78) was the most intense emotion when compared to guilt (M = 2.10, SD = 0.97, p
< 0.01), fear (M = 2.13, SD = 1.06, p < 0.01), serenity (M = 1.92, SD = 0.88, p < 0.01), and
fatigue (M = 1.88, SD = 0.88, p < 0.01), which were not statistically different from each other (ps
> 0.92). At post-intervention assessment, there was also a significant difference in reported
emotional intensity across the five emotions after the self-induced sadness task, [F(1, 74) =
30.62, p < 0.01]. Again sadness (M = 3.06, SD = 1.00) showed the highest intensity, followed by
serenity (M = 2.54, SD = 0.92, p = 0.03). Guilt (M = 1.81, SD = 0.89), fear (M = 1.48, SD =
0.87), and fatigue (M = 1.94, SD = 0.91) were not statistically different from each other (ps >
0.23), but were significantly lower in reported intensity than sadness (ps < 0.01) and serenity (ps
< 0.04). It is possible that because participants (sham-) meditated during the post-training
assessment, that increased the level of serenity. There were no training condition differences in
pre- and post-intervention emotion intensity (ps > 0.68), nor did training condition interact with
the reported intensity of the five emotions (i.e., sadness, guilt, fear, serenity, and fatigue; ps >
0.18).
Does self-other distance predict empathic simulation? To examine the impact of selfother distance (defined by actress race) on empathic simulation, assessed via pre-intervention
frontal alpha asymmetry scores (cf., Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012), a 3 (self-other distance; 0 =
ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self) x 4 (EEG channel location; 0 = F1/F2, 1 = F3/F4, 2 = F5/F6, 3 =
F7/F8) repeated measures mixed model was constructed using SAS (v9.4) PROC MIXED;
channel location was included to test for specific spatial localization of self-other distance
effects. Self-other distance predicted frontal alpha asymmetry scores [F(2, 144) = 18.42, p <
0.01]. Planned contrasts were performed to decompose the effect of self-other distance on alpha
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asymmetry scores across the four channel pairs. Other (Black) race videos elicited significantly
higher right frontal alpha (M = −0.029, SD = 0.235) than self-induced sadness (M = −0.066, SD =
0.189), [t(144) = −5.57, p < 0.01]. Same race videos also elicited significantly higher right
frontal alpha (M = −0.038, SD = 0.176) than self-induced sadness, [t(144) = −4.92, p < .01].
Because alpha frequency oscillations are thought to be inversely related to empathic simulation
(e.g., Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012), lower scores indicate more empathic simulation. One final
contrast compared White race vs. Black race videos on alpha asymmetry scores. Other race
videos did not produce higher alpha asymmetry scores than same race videos across channel
pairs, [t(144) = 0.72, p = 0.47]. Figure 5 summarizes these results showing self – other
differences of alpha asymmetry scores at each channel pair. Channel location, [F(3, 228) = 2.26,
p = 0.08] and channel location x self-other distance interaction [F(6, 432) = 1.38, p = 0.22] did
not predict alpha asymmetry scores.

Figure 5. Mean alpha asymmetry scores (log right alpha−log left alpha) during self-induced and
observed sadness according to racial group membership. More negative scores indicate greater
withdrawal and negative emotionality. Bars indicate standard errors.
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Do frontal alpha asymmetry scores predict state empathy? Three random coefficients
MLM models were constructed using SAS (v9.4) PROC MIXED to examine the relation
between pre-intervention frontal alpha asymmetry scores and self-reported, video-based
empathic concern, empathic sadness, and empathic distress across channel pair locations. As
indicated in Table 2, frontal alpha asymmetry scores at medial frontal channel locations F1/F2
and F3/4 were negatively related to empathic sadness; as previously mentioned negative
coefficients in these analyses indicate that higher negative emotionality (reflected in lower
frontal alpha asymmetry scores) is associated with empathic sadness underlain by increased
neural activity of the right prefrontal cortex. Lateral frontal channel locations were not
associated with self-reported empathic concern, empathic sadness, and empathic distress. Also,
frontal alpha asymmetry scores at F3/F4 negatively predicted empathic distress; no other channel
pairs were associated with empathic distress, nor did alpha asymmetry at any channel pair
predict empathic concern.
Table 2. MLM models showing baseline prediction of empathic concern, empathic sadness, and
empathic distress by frontal alpha asymmetry scores.
Empathic Concern
Channel

Empathic Sadness

b

SE(b)

t(216)

p

b

SE(b) t(216)

F1/F2

−0.65

0.63

−1.04

0.30

−2.05

0.65

F3/F4

−0.90

0.67

−1.35

0.18

−0.99

F5/F6

−0.13

0.63

−0.20

0.84

F7/F8

−0.40

0.36

−1.11

0.27

Empathic Distress
p

b

SE(b) t(216)

−3.18

<0.01

0.23

0.62

0.37

0.72

0.33

−3.02

<0.01

−1.12

0.57

−1.95

0.05

0.12

0.61

0.19

0.85

−0.95

0.57

−1.67

0.10

−0.68

0.58

−1.17

0.24

−0.07

0.33

−0.22

0.82

Notes. Channel pair location was disaggregated into individual channel pair variables, so as to
keep all predictors and the self-reported empathy outcome at level 1 in MLM models. Crossing
channel pair location with alpha asymmetry scores would inadvertently change the self-reported
empathy outcome from level 1 to level 2, while both channel pair location and alpha asymmetry
scores would remain at level 1.
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p

Primary question 1.1: Does mindfulness training predict training related changes in
empathic simulation? To test whether MT predicts change in empathic simulation, as measured
by pre-post-intervention change in frontal alpha asymmetry, I constructed a 3 (self-other
distance; 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self) x 4 (channel location; 0 = F1/F2, 1 = F3/F4, 2 =
F5/F6, 3 = F7/F8) x 2 (training; 0 = ST, 1 = MT) repeated measures mixed model that included
pre-training alpha asymmetry scores as predictors. This initial model failed to converge because
of infinite likelihood in the estimation. Therefore, to simplify the analysis, additional models
tested the effect of training condition and self-other distance at each channel pair separately.
Here I only detail analyses at the F1/F2 channel pair, as training condition did not produce
change in alpha asymmetry at any of the other channel pairs (ps > 0.38). Table 3 shows that
there was no main effect of intervention on alpha asymmetry scores. Table 3 also shows that
pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores were positively related to post-intervention alpha
asymmetry scores. Self-other distance modulated post-intervention alpha asymmetry scores
consistent with pre-training results; specifically, self-induced sadness produced lower postintervention frontal alpha asymmetry scores than ingroup (White actress), [t(132) = −6.44, p <
0.01] and outgroup (Black actress) sadness observation, [t(132) = −6.65, p < 0.01]; ingroup and
outgroup sadness observation did not differ in post-intervention alpha asymmetry scores, [t(132)
= −0.00, p = 0.99]. Pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores also interacted with self-other
distance to predict alpha asymmetry scores. More importantly this interaction was qualified by
an intervention x pre-training alpha x self-other distance interaction (see Table 3).
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Table 3. Multilevel model showing F1/F2 alpha asymmetry score change by intervention
condition.
Effect

df

F

P

Self-Other Distance

(2, 132) 13.06

<0.01

Pre-Intervention Alpha

(1, 555) 39.86

<0.01

Intervention

(1, 71)

0.69

0.41

Intervention x Self-Other Distance

(2, 132)

0.57

0.57

Intervention x Pre-Intervention Alpha

(1, 555)

0.55

0.46

Self-other Distance x Pre-Intervention Alpha

(2, 555) 10.37

<0.01

Intervention x Self-Other Distance x Pre-Intervention Alpha

(2, 555)

<0.01

7.86

Notes. Self-Other Distance coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self; intervention coded as 0
= ST, 1 = MT.

To decompose the significant intervention x self-other distance x pre-intervention alpha
interaction, six contrasts were performed by examining pre- to post-change in alpha asymmetry
scores within each training condition and self-other distance condition (see Figure 6). These
analyses revealed that those receiving MT showed significant pre- to post-intervention increases
in alpha asymmetry scores during ingroup, [t(147) = 3.41, p < 0.01], and outgroup, [t(146) =
3.28, p < 0.01], video observation tasks but not in the self-induced sadness task, [t(33) = 0.75, p
= 0.46]. This indicates that while there was no pre- to post-intervention change in sadness felt
during recollection of a sad autobiographical event, MT participants showed significantly lower
empathic simulation toward White and Black targets at post-intervention assessment. Those
receiving ST showed no pre- to post-intervention increases in alpha asymmetry scores during
ingroup, [t(137) = 0.67, p = 0.51] and outgroup, [t(139) = 0.54, p = 0.59], video observation
tasks, and thus evidenced no change in empathic simulation. Also, there was no pre- to postintervention change in frontal alpha asymmetry among ST participants in the self-induced
sadness task, [t(30) =0.18, p = 0.86].
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Figure 6. Pre- to post-intervention changes in alpha asymmetry scores (log right alpha−log left alpha) during self-induced and
observed sadness according to intervention condition. More negative scores indicate greater empathic simulation of sadness during
the video observation task.
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Primary question 1.2: Does mindfulness training predict training-related changes in
empathic concern in response to sadness videos? Three 2 (training; ST = 0, MT =1) x 2 (selfother distance; ingroup = 0, outgroup = 1) repeated measures mixed models were constructed to
examine the effect of intervention on pre- to post-intervention changes in empathic concern,
empathic sadness, and empathic distress. Table 4 shows a main effect of self-other distance,
such that lower empathic concern and empathic sadness was felt for outgroup (Black) individuals
than for ingroup (White) targets expressing sadness. Pre-intervention empathic concern was also
positively related to post-intervention empathic concern. Also, analyses revealed significant preintervention empathy x self-other distance interactions for empathic concern and empathic
sadness. Last, as significant training x pre-intervention empathy x self-other distance interaction
was found for empathic concern. Figure 7 shows this decomposition of the significant
interaction. This significant 3-way interaction was decomposed by examining pre- to postintervention change within each training condition and each self-other distance condition. MT
participants did not show statistically significant pre- to post-intervention changes in empathic
concern for racial ingroup members, [t(156) = 0.07, p = 0.95]. But MT participants did show a
significant increase in empathic concern for racial outgroup members, [t(158) = 2.57, p < 0.01].
ST participants showed a significant decrease in empathic concern for racial ingroup members,
[t(141) = −3.23, p < 0.01], but no change for racial outgroup members [t(150) = 0.47, p = 0.64].
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Table 4. Multilevel models showing prediction of post-intervention empathic concern, empathic sadness, and empathic distress by
training.

Effect

df

Empathic

Empathic

Empathic

Concern

Sadness

Distress

F

p

F

P

F

p

Self-Other Distance

(1, 526)

7.48

<0.01

5.00

0.03

0.88

0.35

Pre-Intervention Empathy

(1, 526)

5.80

0.02

3.31

0.07

3.24

0.07

Intervention

(1, 75)

0.13

0.72

2.81

0.09

0.12

0.73

Self-Other Distance x Intervention

(1, 526)

0.01

0.91

0.84

0.36

0.00

0.98

Pre-Intervention Empathy x Intervention

(1, 526)

0.43

0.51

2.82

0.09

0.10

0.75

Pre-Intervention Empathy x Self-Other Distance

(1, 526) 10.38

<0.01

8.84

<0.01

1.68

0.20

Intervention x Pre-Intervention Empathy x Self-Other Distance

(1, 526)

<0.01

0.46

0.50

0.06

0.80

5.28

Notes. Self-Other Distance coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self; intervention coded as 0 = ST, 1 = MT.
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Figure 7. (a) Pre- to post-intervention change in empathic concern and (b) empathic sadness for
ingroup and outgroup members. (c) Pre- to post-intervention change in empathic concern for
ingroup and outgroup members by training condition.
Secondary questions 1.1 – 1.4: Does dispositional mindfulness predict empathic
simulation and empathic concern in response to sadness videos? Prediction of preintervention frontal alpha asymmetry scores by trait mindfulness was tested using a 3 (self-other
distance; 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self) x 4 (channel location; 0 = F1/F2, 1 = F3/F4, 2 =
F5/F6, 3 = F7/F8) repeated measures MLM model. As done previously, self-other distance,
channel pair location, and self-other distance x channel pair location were included in the model.
Also included as predictors in the model were trait mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS,
MAAS x self-other distance, and MAAS x self-other distance x channel pair location. None of
these mindfulness terms predicted pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores (ps > 0.33). A
planned follow-up model tested the stability of the MAAS relations after controlling for trait
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agreeableness, racism, social dominance orientation, and empathy, as per Secondary Question
1.2. Again, trait mindfulness not related to pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores. As
previously shown, this model indicated that pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores were
predicted by self-other distance, and test statistics of omnibus and planned comparisons were
relatively stable compared to what is described in section entitled “Does self-other distance
predict empathic simulation?”. Only one psychological trait, social dominance orientation,
predicted higher frontal alpha asymmetry scores. This indicated that those higher in social
dominance orientation show less empathic simulation before training.
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Table 5. Multilevel model showing prediction of pre-training frontal alpha asymmetry scores by
psychological traits, self-other distance, and EEG channel pair location.
Effect

df

F

p

Self-Other Distance

(2, 144) 18.52

<0.01

Channel location

(3, 228)

2.23

0.08

Self-Other Distance x Channel location

(6, 432)

1.41

0.21

MAAS

(1, 75)

0.00

0.95

NEO-A

(1, 75)

0.08

0.77

MRS

(1, 75)

0.13

0.72

SDO

(1, 75)

3.70

0.05

IRI-FS

(1, 75)

1.19

0.28

IRI-PT

(1, 75)

0.46

0.50

IRI-EC

(1, 75)

0.23

0.63

IRI-PD

(1, 75)

0.00

0.99

MAAS x Self-Other Distance

(2, 144)

1.13

0.32

MAAS x Self-Other Distance x Channel location

(9, 795)

0.89

0.54

Notes. Self-other Distance was coded 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup, 2 = self; Channel location was
coded 0 = F1/F2, 1 = F3/F4, 2 = F5/F6, 3 = F7/F8; MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale; NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern Racism Scale; SDO = Social
Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; FS = Fantasy subscale; PT =
Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD = personal distress.

Prediction of pre-intervention empathic concern, empathic sadness, and empathic distress
by psychological traits and self-other distance were tested in three separate repeated measures
mixed models – one for each outcome. Initial models testing the relation of the MAAS to
subjective empathy were not significant, so models reporting all psychological traits included in
the study are shown.in Table 6. Self-other distance predicted pre-intervention empathic concern,
empathic sadness, and empathic distress, such that participants felt less subjective empathy for
outgroup members across all three measures. Dispositional mindfulness was not associated with
self-reported pre-intervention empathy. Trait personal distress predicted higher pre-intervention
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empathic sadness and empathic distress, and perspective taking predicted higher pre-intervention
empathic sadness. No other traits were related to state empathy outcomes.
Table 6. Multilevel models showing prediction of pre-training empathic concern, empathic
sadness, and empathic distress by psychological traits and self-other distance (video stimuli
only).

Effect

df

Empathic

Empathic

Empathic

Concern

Sadness

Distress

F

p

F

<0.01

4.49

P

F

p

0.04

9.44

<0.01

Self-Other Distance

(1, 77) 11.21

MAAS

(1, 70)

0.00

0.97

2.51

0.12

0.06

0.81

NEO-A

(1, 70)

0.34

0.56

0.67

0.42

0.07

0.80

MRS

(1, 70)

0.00

0.99

1.47

0.23

3.52

0.06

SDO

(1, 70)

0.13

0.72

1.08

0.30

0.46

0.50

IRI-FS

(1, 70)

0.57

0.45

0.71

0.40

0.22

0.64

IRI-PT

(1, 70)

0.80

0.37

4.60

0.03

2.26

0.14

IRI-EC

(1, 70)

0.99

0.32

0.85

0.36

0.60

0.44

IRI-PD

(1, 70)

3.00

0.09

13.61

<0.01

14.22

<0.01

MAAS x Self-Other Distance

(1, 77)

1.08

0.30

2.32

0.12

1.47

0.22

Notes. Self-other Distance coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup. MAAS = Mindful Attention
Awareness Scale; NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern Racism Scale; SDO
= Social Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; FS = Fantasy
subscale; PT = Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD = Personal
Distress subscale.

Video observation task results summary. Primary question 1.1, which asked if MT,
relative to ST, would increase empathic simulation of outgroup members’ sadness, was not
supported. In fact, MT showed the opposite effect – namely, it reduced empathic simulation as
evidenced by increased post-intervention frontal alpha asymmetry scores. Primary question 1.2
was partially supported. I found that, while starting values of empathic concern toward outgroup
members were lower among MT participants at pre-intervention video observation than among
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ST participants, MT increased empathic concern (but not empathic sadness or empathic distress)
for outgroup sadness. However, it is difficult to attribute this pre- to post-intervention change in
empathic concern to mindfulness training, per se, as MT and ST conditions did not statistically
differ on post-intervention empathic concern. Taken together, these results do not strongly
support putative mechanisms for the instantiation of empathy by mindfulness. For example,
Berry, Cairo, et al. (2017) suggest that mindfulness may promote empathy through enhanced
emotion matching or empathic simulation, but these results suggest a re-thinking of that
hypothesis.
Secondary questions 1.1 and 1.2 were not supported; trait mindfulness was not associated
with pre-intervention frontal alpha asymmetry scores. However, the pre-training frontal alpha
asymmetry scores were related to empathic sadness measured immediately after video
observation, and were sensitive to the self-other distance manipulation. Secondary questions 1.3
and 1.4 were not supported. Trait mindfulness was not associated with pre-intervention state
empathic concern, empathic sadness, or empathic distress. All of these empathy measures were
mutable to self-other distance, which for these self-report measures included ingroup and
outgroup observation responses (but not self-sadness). A dispositional tendency to experience
empathic personal distress was related to pre-intervention empathic sadness and empathic
distress, as expected, and perspective taking was associated with higher empathic sadness.
Scenario-based and Daily Helping Behavior Results
Primary Question 2.1: Does mindfulness training increases scenario-based helping
frequency? Primary question 2.1 was tested using a 2 (training; 0 = ST, 1 = MT) x 2 (helping
scenario order (0 = crutches first, 1 = papers first) x 2 (pre-training help; 0 = no help, 1 = help)
binary outcome MLM model; the post-intervention helping outcome was coded as 0 = no help
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and 1 = help1. As seen in Table 7, MT showed significantly higher post-intervention helping
frequency (M = 78.95%) than ST (M = 56.76%), but most importantly, the significant
intervention condition x pre-intervention help (yes, no) interaction, indicates that MT showed a
significant change from pre- to post-intervention. Figure 8 displays this interaction effect.
Table 7. Multilevel binary logistic outcome models showing prediction of post-intervention
scenario-based helping by intervention condition.
Effect

B

SE(b)

t(69)

p

2.86

1.22

2.36

0.02

Scenario order

−0.92

1.31

0.70

0.49

Pre-Intervention Help

−1.90

1.23

1.54

0.13

Intervention x Pre-Intervention Help

−3.17

1.63

−1.94

0.05

Intervention x Scenario order

−2.04

1.58

−1.28

0.20

Scenario order x Pre-Intervention Help

−2.59

1.81

−1.43

0.16

3.71

2.30

1.61

0.11

Intervention

Intervention x Pre-Intervention Help x Order

Notes. Intervention coded as 0 = ST, 1 = MT; scenario order coded as 0 = crutches first, 1 =
paper drop first; Pre-Intervention Help coded as 0 = no help, 1 = help.

1

Help recipient (confederate) height did not predict pre- or post-intervention helping frequency
nor did it interact with intervention (ps > 0.14), and so was not considered further.
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Figure 8. Pre- and post-intervention helping frequency as predicted by training condition.
Secondary questions 2.1 and 2.2: Does trait mindfulness predicts more frequent preintervention scenario-based helping? As a test of secondary question 2.1., bivariate relations
among psychological traits and pre-intervention scenario-based helping behavior were examined
using simple binary logistic regression, constructed in SPSS (v24) (see Table 8). As predicted,
dispositional mindfulness predicted more frequent pre-intervention helping behavior;
examination of the 95% confidence interval of the odds ratio indicates that for each 1-point
increase on the MAAS, one is between 1.24 and 5.81 times more likely to provide help. This is
consistent with Berry, Brown, et al., (2017), who showed a significant relation between MAAS
and scenario-based helping, but an imprecise effect size. Also, positively related to helping
behavior were agreeableness, and the fantasy, perspective taking, and empathic concern
subscales of the IRI measure of trait empathy (Davis, 1980; 1983). Phone use or other
technology use during the scenario predicted less frequent help.
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics and bivariate relations (odds ratios and 95% CIs) among trait
predictors and pre-intervention scenario helping behavior.

Predictor
Intervention

Pre-Intervention Scenario
Helping
OR
95% CI
0.76
[0.31, 1.88]

Scenario order

1.10

[0.44, 2.71]

Phone use

0.29*

[0.10, 0.85]

MAAS

2.68*

[1.24, 5.81]

NEO-A

3.55*

[1.31, 9.64]

MRS

0.40

[0.09, 1.81]

SDO

0.66

[0.35, 1.26]

IRI-FS

1.19**

[1.07, 1.31]

IRI-PT

1.18*

[1.04, 1.35]

IRI-EC

1.16*

[1.01, 1.32]

IRI-PD

1.01

[0.92, 1.10]

M helping

57.14%

Notes. Intervention coded as 0 = ST, 1 = MT; scenario order coded as 0 = crutches first, 1 =
paper drop first; phone use coded as 0 = no technology use, 1 = using technology. MAAS =
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern
Racism Scale; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index;
FS = Fantasy subscale; PT = Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD
= Personal Distress subscale.
*p ≤ 0.05, **p < .01
To test the strength of the dispositional mindfulness – helping relation, a three-block
hierarchical logistic regression was constructed in SPSS (v24) to examine the role of phone use,
agreeableness, racism, social dominance orientation, and trait empathy on pre-intervention
helping behavior in block one. Mindfulness was loaded into block two, and to replicate findings
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from Berry, Brown, et al. (2017) (shown in Appendix D), a mindfulness x racism interaction
term and a mindfulness x social dominance orientation interaction term was loaded into block
three. Table 9 shows that in block one phone use predicted less frequent helping, and the fantasy
subscale of the IRI predicted more frequent helping. The mindfulness – helping relation in block
two remained positive and statistically significant, but the 95% confidence interval around the
odds ratio estimate was imprecise, namely for each 1-point increase on the MAAS, a person is
between 1.74 and 25.24 times more likely to provide help. Such imprecision in the effect size
estimate leaves uncertainty regarding the impact of trait mindfulness on scenario-based helping.
Finally, the mindfulness x racism and mindfulness x social dominance orientation interactions
were not related to pre-intervention scenario-based helping.
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Table 9. Three-block hierarchical logistic regression results showing prediction of scenariobased helping by phone use, psychological traits including mindfulness, and mindfulness by
prejudicial attitudes interactions.
Pre-Training Help
OR

95% CI

Df

2

Phone

0.27*

[0.07, 1.00]

8

26.10**

NEO-A

3.05

[0.90, 10.29]

MRS

1.31

[0.19, 8.80]

SDO

0.75

[0.31, 1.83]

IRI-FS

1.20**

[1.06, 1.36]

IRI-PT

1.12

[0.93, 1.34]

IRI-EC

0.91

[0.74, 1.13]

IRI-PD

0.95

[0.86, 1.07]

Step 2

MAAS

6.63**

[1.74, 25.24]

9

9.92**

Step 3

MAAS*MRS

1.17

[0.03, 42.96] 11

MAAS*SDO

3.23

[0.29, 36.16]

Block

Predictor

Step 1

1.53

Notes. Phone use coded as 0 = no technology use, 1 = using technology. MAAS = Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale; NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern Racism
Scale; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; FS =
Fantasy subscale; PT = Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD =
Personal Distress subscale.
*p ≤ 0.05, **p < .01

Frequency of daily helpful, positive, and antagonistic behaviors. Prior to examining
primary question 2.2, summary statistics of daily helping, positive, and antagonistic behavior
frequency were examined. As shown in Figure 9 calculated daily helping behavior frequencies
were lower than expected. Rameson et al., (2012) and Morelli et al., (2014) showed helping
frequencies as high as 2.19 per day. However, I found helping frequencies averaging 0.20 per
day (or 1 helping behavior per person every five days, on average), ten times less than in the
aforementioned studies. One reason for this much lower helping frequency could be the
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inclusion of pleasant and antagonistic behaviors that did not include helping; with only one type
of stranger or acquaintance interaction recorded (i.e., helping behaviors), participants in previous
studies may have been seeking situations to engage in such behaviors. In this study, there was
no clear behavioral target with the inclusion of pleasant and antagonistic behaviors alongside
helping behavior. Figure 9 shows that pleasant interactions were consistently more frequent than
helping behavior, and antagonistic behaviors were rare; there also appeared to be a cyclical
pattern in the behavior frequency, with helping behavior peaking during weekdays and occurring
less frequently on the weekends. Pleasant behaviors appeared to reach peak frequency on Fridays
and Saturdays when racial ingroup members were the target, but when racial outgroup members
were the target, pleasant behaviors were less frequent during the weekend and more frequent on
Mondays.
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Figure 9. Pre- and post-intervention day-to-day helping, pleasant, and antagonistic behavioral frequencies by ingroup/outgroup target
membership and day of week.
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Primary question 2.2: Does mindfulness training increase daily helping frequency
toward outgroup members? Visual inspection of frequency plots revealed a preponderance of
zero counts for daily helping, pleasant, or antagonistic behavior. Because of this, a zero-inflated
Poisson mixed model was used to test predictions by day of assessment, weekly cyclicity (sine
vs. cosine), target group membership (0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup), and intervention condition (0
= ST, 1 = MT) on daily helping behavior toward strangers and acquaintances using SAS (v9.4)
PROC NLMIXED. Table 10 shows a significant sine-curve pattern of post-intervention helping
frequency; specifically, helping behavior reached peak frequency during weekdays, and was
lowest on weekends. Pre-training helping frequency was positively associated with post-training
helping frequency. Also, helping behavior was less frequent for outgroup members, relative to
ingroup members. MT and ST did not differ in post-intervention helping frequency change from
pre-intervention helping baselines.
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Table 10. Multilevel zero-inflated Poisson model showing prediction of post-training daily
helping by intervention condition.

Effect

b

SE(b)

t(1810)

p

−0.01

0.01

−0.44

0.66

Wkcycle Sine

0.21

0.08

2.61

<0.01

Wkcycle Cosine

0.07

0.08

0.91

0.36

Pre-Intervention Help

0.42

0.15

2.73

<0.01

−0.35

0.18

−1.97

0.05

Intervention

0.26

0.30

0.87

0.38

Intervention x Group Membership

0.10

0.25

0.39

0.70

Group Membership x Pre-Intervention Help

−0.26

0.22

−1.22

0.22

Intervention x Group Membership x Pre-Intervention Help

−0.12

0.21

−0.62

0.68

Day of assessment

Group Membership

Notes. Day of assessment = 0 – 13; wkcycle sine = sin(2 x pi x Day / 7); wkcycle cosine = cos(2
x pi x Day / 7); target group membership coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup; intervention coded
as 0 = ST, 1 = MT.
Secondary questions 2.3. and 2.4: Does trait mindfulness predicts more frequent
daily helping? Three zero inflated Poisson mixed models examined the role of day of
assessment, weekly cyclicity (sine vs. cosine), target group membership (0 = ingroup, 1 =
outgroup), trait mindfulness, and trait mindfulness x target group membership on preintervention daily helping, pleasant, and antagonistic behavior toward strangers and
acquaintances. Table 11 shows that helping behaviors and pleasant behaviors were less frequent
throughout the 14-day assessment period, and there was a sine-shaped weekly cyclicity pattern in
helping behavior that reached peak frequency during weekdays and was lowest during weekends,
but a cosine-shaped weekly cyclicity pattern in pleasant interactions that was highest on Fridays
and Saturdays and dropped sharply on Sunday and Monday. Although helping, pleasant, and
antagonistic behaviors were lower for racial outgroup members compared to racial ingroup
members, this difference was only statistically significant for pleasant behaviors. Trait
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mindfulness predicted more frequent helping behavior, but did not interact with target group
membership. This indicates that trait mindfulness was associated with increased pre-intervention
helping toward strangers and acquaintances regardless of their ingroup-outgroup status.
Table 11. Multilevel zero-inflated Poisson models showing prediction of pre-intervention daily
helping by trait mindfulness.
Helping
Effect

t(2025)

Pleasant
p

Antagonistic

t(2025)

p

t(2025)

p

−3.34

<0.01

−3.22

<0.01

−1.28

0.20

Wkcycle Sine

3.22

<0.01

0.15

0.88

1.40

0.16

Wkcycle Cosine

1.57

0.12

−4.36

<0.01

−0.75

0.46

−1.70

0.09

−8.29

<0.01

−1.83

0.07

MAAS

1.96

0.05

0.30

0.77

−0.72

0.47

MAAS* Group Membership

0.55

0.58

1.36

0.17

−0.36

0.71

Day

Group Membership

Notes. Day of assessment = 0 – 13; wkcycle sine = sin(2 x pi x Day / 7); wkcycle cosine = cos(2
x pi x Day / 7); target group membership coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup; MAAS = Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale.

To test the strength of the trait mindfulness to daily helping relation the same model was
tested with the inclusion of psychological trait predictors of pre-intervention daily helping
behavior toward strangers and acquaintances. Table 12 shows that participants helped outgroup
members less frequently than ingroup members, and this relation was attenuated by trait
empathic fantasy. Those higher in trait empathic fantasy showed more frequent ingroup (vs.
outgroup) helping, while those lower in the trait were not significantly different in ingroup and
outgroup helping. Again, trait mindfulness was associated with more frequent helping regardless
of behavioral target group membership.
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Table 12. Multilevel zero-inflated Poisson model showing prediction of pre-intervention daily
helping by mindfulness, agreeableness, racism, social dominance orientation, and empathy trait
scores.

Effect

b

SE(b)

−0.05

0.01

−3.76** <0.01

0.23

0.07

3.22** <0.01

−0.20

0.10

MAAS

0.55

0.21

2.59** <0.01

NEO-A

0.12

0.23

0.52

0.60

MRS

−0.27

0.46

−0.63

0.53

SDO

−0.30

0.19

−1.58

0.11

IRI-FS

0.06

0.02

IRI-PT

−0.05

0.03

−1.61

0.11

IRI-EC

−0.04

0.04

−1.10

0.27

MAAS x Group Membership

0.03

0.16

0.16

0.88

IRI-FS x Group Membership

−0.04

0.01

Day of Assessment
Wkcycle Sine
Group Membership

t(2022)

−2.05*

2.35*

P

0.04

0.02

−2.24** 0.02

Notes. Day of assessment = 0 – 13; wkcycle sine = sin(2 x pi x Day / 7); target group
membership coded as 0 = ingroup, 1 = outgroup; MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale.
NEO-A = NEO Agreeableness subscale; MRS = Modern Racism Scale; SDO = Social
Dominance Orientation Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; FS = Fantasy subscale; PT =
Perspective Taking subscale; EC = Empathic Concern subscale; PD = Personal Distress subscale.

Scenario-based and daily helping behavior results summary. Primary question 2.1
asked whether mindfulness training, relative to sham meditation training, could increase
scenario-based post-intervention helping frequency for outgroup members. There was support
for this hypothesis, namely, a significant pre-post increase to helping frequency for MT
participants relative to ST participants. Primary question 2.2 tested whether the effects on
helping shown in primary question 2.1 were also present in daily living. There was no support
for this hypothesis, as relative to ST, MT did not change daily helping frequency toward
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outgroup members. Of note were markedly low daily helping frequencies - on average one
helping instance every five days per person, which was more than ten times as infrequent as in
previous studies (Morelli et al., 2014; Rameson et al., 2012).
Trait mindfulness predicted more frequent pre-intervention scenario-based helping
behavior for racial outgroup members and remained stable after controlling for trait empathy,
racism, social dominance orientation, and agreeableness. These results strongly support
secondary questions 2.1 and 2.2. As noted previously, however, a large range of the 95% CI
around the effect size estimate of the mindfulness – helping relation made it difficult to pinpoint
a reliable effect size. Secondary questions 2.3 and 2.4 asked whether trait mindfulness predicted
more frequent pre-intervention daily helping behavior toward outgroup members. Results
indicated that trait mindfulness, indeed predicted more frequent helping behavior and did so after
controlling for trait empathy, racism, social dominance orientation, and agreeableness. Scores on
the fantasy subscale of the IRI were also positively associated with scenario-based and daily
helping frequency, and specifically for racial outgroup members. This empathic fantasy –
helping behavior relation was not expected, as other empathy-related traits have been more
frequently associated with helping behavior (i.e., perspective taking and empathic concern;
Penner et al, 1995).
General Discussion
Humans have a desire to establish and maintain social relationships with others
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000), so much so that we often automatically
empathize with others and help them when they are in need (de Waal, 2008). But people are
generally more likely to show kindness to non-biological kin when they are like oneself –
defined by social ingroup and outgroup categories (Cikara et al., 2011; Decety & Chaminade,
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2003) – perhaps because similar individuals are more likely to reciprocate help and cooperation
(Trivers, 1971). Our world, however, is increasingly interdependent and interconnected, and
geographic distance is no longer a major barrier between self and others. Thus, it is important to
ask how kindness can be fostered across socio-cultural lines.
This study asked whether mindfulness training would increase empathic simulation of
and empathic concern for racial outgroup members (primary questions 1.1 and 1.2, respectively)
during a video observation task depicting expressions of sadness in adult females from both
White and Black racial groups. This study also asked whether mindfulness training would
increase prosocial action toward racial outgroup members in staged scenarios performed in the
lab (primary question 2.1) and in daily life (primary question 2.2). As shown in Table 13,
support was obtained for two of these four questions. Convergent tests of the role of
mindfulness on empathy and helping were conducted by examining associations between trait
mindfulness and measures of empathy and prosocial action. Specifically, I asked whether trait
mindfulness predicted greater empathic simulation and empathic concern (secondary questions
1.1 and 1.3, respectively) during the video observation task. Tests of the strength of these trait
mindfulness – empathy relations statistically controlled for trait agreeableness, racism, social
dominance orientation, and trait empathy (secondary questions 1.2 and 1.4, respectively). No
support was found for these four trait mindfulness questions (see Table 13). This study also
examined whether trait mindfulness predicted more frequent helping behavior toward racial
outgroup members in staged scenarios performed in the lab (secondary question 2.1) and in daily
life (secondary question 2.3); the strength of these relations in secondary questions 2.1 and 2.3
were tested by controlling for trait agreeableness, racism, social dominance orientation, and trait
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empathy (secondary questions 2.2 and 2.4, respectively). Support was found for all four of these
trait mindfulness hypotheses.
Table 13. Primary and secondary study questions results summary.
Primary Question
1.1. MT ↑ empathic simulation of
outgroup sadness

Result
MT ↓ empathic simulation

1.2. MT ↑ empathic concern for
outgroup sadness

MT ↑ empathic concern

2.1. MT ↑ scenario-based
helping

MT ↑ helping

Yes

2.2. MT ↑ daily helping
behavior

MT does not change helping

No

Secondary Question
1.1. Trait MAAS ↑ empathic
simulation of outgroup sadness

Result
MT not related to empathic
simulation

Supported?
No

1.2. Trait MAAS ↑ empathic
simulation of outgroup sadness,
controlling for covariates.

MT not related to empathic
simulation

No

1.3. Trait MAAS ↑ empathic concern
for outgroup sadness

MT not related to empathic
concern

No

1.4. Trait MAAS ↑ empathic concern
for outgroup sadness, controlling
for covariates

MT not related to empathic
concern

No

2.1. Trait MAAS ↑ scenario-based
helping

MAAS ↑ helping

Yes

2.2. Trait MAAS ↑ scenario-based
helping, controlling for
covariates

MAAS ↑ helping

Yes

2.3. Trait MAAS ↑ daily helping

MAAS ↑ helping

Yes

2.4. Trait MAAS ↑ daily helping,
controlling for covariates
Notes. ↑ = increase; ↓ = decrease

MAAS ↑ helping

Yes
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Supported?
No – opposite of
predicted direction
Partial

Specifically, mindfulness meditation training, relative to sham meditation training,
increased post-intervention alpha asymmetry scores, which was the opposite of what I predicted
in primary question 1.1. This finding may indicate less empathic simulation among those
receiving mindfulness training. Despite this unexpected finding, mindfulness training, compared
to sham training, significantly increased post-intervention empathic concern (but not empathic
sadness or empathic distress), and did so specifically toward racial outgroup members rather than
racial ingroup members. Thus, support was obtained for primary question 1.2. Mindfulness
training increased post-intervention scenario-based helping frequency toward a racial outgroup
members (primary question 2.1); however, post-intervention daily helping behavior was not
changed by intervention (primary question 2.2).
Turning to the secondary questions, which concerned trait mindfulness, this self-reported
disposition was not associated with pre-intervention alpha asymmetry scores or pre-intervention
empathic concern (secondary questions 1.1 – 1.4). However, trait mindfulness predicted more
frequent scenario-based (secondary question 2.1) and daily (secondary question 2.3) helping
behavior, and these relations held after controlling for the traits of agreeableness, racism, social
dominance orientation, and empathy (secondary questions 2.2 & 2.4).
The majority of these findings are consistent with theory on the place of mindfulness in
social relations (Berry & Brown, in press; Davidson & Harrington, 2002; Trautwein et al., 2014)
and with recent empirical work showing that (a) mindfulness promotes prosocial responsiveness
(Berry, Brown, et al., 2017; Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017; Cameron & Fredrickson, 2015; Condon et
al., 2013; Lim et al, 2015) and (b) may do so by increasing empathy (Birnie et al, 2010). The
strength of the present study design allowed me to rule out alternative explanations for the results
that to date have been neglected in mindfulness research on social relations. Pre-post changes in
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empathy and helping were not attributable to differences in the expected benefits of the
interventions. A randomized controlled trial design was used with pre-post intervention
assessments rather than post-test only assessment, the design most commonly used in
mindfulness research concerning prosociality to date (Condon, in press). Furthermore, the use of
a sham meditation control allowed me to rule out placebo effects of relaxed breathing and belief
that one is meditating as the source of differences in pre-post-intervention change in study
outcomes by mindfulness training (Zeidan et al., 2010, 2011). Previous intervention studies of
the effect of meditation training on prosocial responsiveness have compared mindfulness training
to a waitlist control condition (Condon et al., 2013) or to an active control that did not involve
meditation-like activities (Lim et al., 2015; Quaglia, 2016); in these studies, participants may
have been aware that they were in a control condition. Awareness that one is in a particular
condition may create biased responses; for example, participants may attempt to corroborate (or
discredit) what they perceive are the study hypotheses, or may lose motivation to participate
(fully). These biased responses can occur in waitlist control or active control conditions,
particularly if participants are not adequately deceived about their condition assignment.
Mindfulness training increases post-intervention alpha asymmetry scores. Relative
to sham meditation training, mindfulness training increased post-intervention alpha asymmetry
scores, believed to reflect lower empathic simulation. Berry, Brown, et al. (2017) suggested that
mindfulness training may increase “emotion matching,” as mindfulness training directs one’s
attention to somatic and mental processes (i.e., interoceptive awareness; Bornemann et al., 2014;
Hӧlzel et al., 2011). This interoceptive awareness to one’s own experiences during unpleasant
events serves as the basis for simulating the experiences of distressed, sad, or otherwise in need
others (Singer et al., 2009). As previously mentioned, emotion matching is often lower in
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intergroup contexts (Aventati et al., 2010; Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Gutsell & Inzlicht 2010,
2012), perhaps because perceiving similarity between self and other may be necessary to
understand the experiences of the other in the first place (Decety and Sommerville 2003; Hein
and Singer 2008; Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2009). Thus, I predicted that mindfulness
training would increase emotion matching, as evidenced by more negative post-intervention
frontal alpha asymmetry scores.
The increase in frontal alpha asymmetry scores was unexpected, and is inconsistent with
the results of Gutsell (2014) and Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010, 2012). There is currently a relative
paucity of research concerning alpha asymmetry as a valid indicator of empathic simulation
which may impact interpretation of the present findings concerning alpha. I offer three
alternative explanations to this alpha asymmetry finding that were not tested in this study. First,
the present finding may be related to the emotion regulatory advantage attributed to mindfulness
training (see Arch & Landy, 2015 for review). For the instantiation of empathic concern and
helping behavior, it is important to regulate one’s own affective responses that occur when
witnessing another person in need (Batson et al., 2015; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Haidt, 2003;
Zaki, 2014). Recent theory and research (Woodruff, Martin, et al., 2011; Woodruff, Daut,
Brower, & Bragg, 2011; Woodruff & Klein, 2013) indicates that EEG-based indicators of mirror
neuron activity may have an inverted “U” relation with positive empathic traits like empathic
concern, where low empathic simulation and high empathic simulation do not conduce to
prosocial responsiveness. On the one hand, a lack of empathic simulation may indicate
indifference to, or poor understanding of the affected person’s distress. On the other hand, an
overabundance of empathic simulation may reflect an unregulated vicarious emotional response
to the affected person’s distress, which has been termed empathic or personal distress – a self-
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oriented emotional response that entails feeling negative affect when witnessing another person
in need but which lacks concern for them (Batson, 1991; Haidt, 2003) Rather, moderate levels of
empathic simulation may be necessary to foster empathic concern and helping behavior. One
way to test this hypothesis with the current data would be to create quadratic frontal alpha
asymmetry scores, and re-compute models examining the effects of intervention on these
quadratic pre- to post-intervention changes in frontal alpha asymmetry scores. If the “adaptive
level” hypothesis is correct as applied to mindfulness training, the resultant parameter estimates
should indicate that mindfulness fosters adaptive levels of empathic simulation.
Another concern with the alpha asymmetry metric that is related to ambiguity about the
present mindfulness training effects, is the fact that while approach-oriented and withdrawaloriented emotions have been considered a two-dimensional construct (Carver & White, 1994),
alpha asymmetry is scored along a single continuum (Davidson & Fox, 1982; Davidson et al,
1990; Sobotka, Davidson, & Senulis, 1992). Thus, it is difficult to disambiguate approach from
withdrawal activation with current frontal alpha asymmetry measurement. A less-used
quantification of frontal alpha asymmetry scores does not include subtracting right from left
homologous pairs; instead, Wheeler et al. (1993) suggest that associations between individual
channels of log-transformed frontal alpha scores and subjective emotions should be compared
across left and right hemispheres. Alpha activity is inversely related to prefrontal cortical
activity. Thus in this approach, negative associations between left hemisphere alpha scores and
subjective emotion reports would indicate that the emotions may be guided by approach-oriented
motivation. Similarly, negative associations between right hemisphere alpha and subjective
emotion reports would suggest the emotions are supported by withdraw-oriented motivation.
Empathic concern is a complex emotion, and may represent an amalgamation of approach and
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withdraw tendencies (Condon, in press; Condon & Feldman Barrett, 2013; Goetz, Keltner, &
Simon-Thomas, 2010). Specifically, empathic concern for someone who is sad, for example,
may begin with empathic simulation of their negative emotion, but if appropriately regulated
(Decety & Jackson, 2004) this response changes to a motivation to ameliorate the pain of the
other, which I conjecture is an approach-related response. If so, the temporal shifts in alpha level
scores during observation of a target in need could be observed.
Replication and extension of Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012). A third alternative
explanation to the mindfulness training – empathic simulation could be related to the partial
replication of the results from Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) obtained in this study. First, alpha
asymmetry scores were lower during contemplation of a sad autobiographical event than when
observing video stimuli of racial outgroup members expressing sadness. However, I also found
that alpha asymmetry scores were lower during self-generated sadness than when observing
video stimuli of racial ingroup members expressing sadness, which was not found in the
aforementioned study. It is noteworthy, that the sample size in the present study (N = 77) is
more than 2.5 times that of the sample size used by Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012; N = 30). It is
possible that Gutsell and Inzlicht’s (2012) sample size lacked the sensitivity necessary to find the
self vs. ingroup difference shown here.
Trait empathy – alpha asymmetry and racism to alpha asymmetry relations were found in
Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012), but not in the present study. Rather, the only psychological trait
related to alpha asymmetry scores was social dominance orientation, a psychological trait closely
related to racism. Finally, the present study extends previous literature, and provides further
evidence of alpha asymmetry scores’ ability to tap empathic simulation, by examining relations
between these neural measures and state self-report measures of empathic concern, empathic
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sadness, and empathic distress. I found that alpha asymmetry was negatively related to empathic
sadness, indicating that higher empathic simulation reflects in greater empathic sadness. These
results suggest that frontal alpha asymmetry in this context may be related to negative emotion
rather than empathy per se. Taken together with the aforementioned alternative explanations of
the mindfulness – alpha asymmetry relation, the present results, and the questions concerning
frontal alpha asymmetry as a marker of empathic simulation provide more questions than
answers regarding neural signatures of the effects of mindfulness training on empathic concern
and helping behavior.
Mindfulness training increases post-intervention empathic concern for outgroup
members. Consistent with Berry, Brown, et al., (2017) and Berry, Cairo, et al., (2017)
mindfulness increased post-intervention empathic concern for racial outgroup members, but
unexpectedly did not increase empathic concern for ingroup members. At its core, “social
mindfulness” is about perceiving others’ suffering with reduced conceptual overlay on what is
perceived (Brown, Berry, Quaglia, 2016; Gyatso, 1995; Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011).
Mindfulness theory suggests that training to enhance this quality of attention fosters kindness for
(dissimilar) others, as familiarity with the pervasive nature of suffering may reveal commonality
among individuals typically perceived to be different from oneself (Berry & Brown, in press).
This study, however, cannot ascertain precise mechanisms of the mindfulness empathic concern
relation, as attempts to test a neural empathic simulation mechanism were unsupported.
Furthermore, it is unlikely (and not currently supported in the literature) that the realization of
such commonality of suffering can be achieved in a mere four days of training. Here I
conjecture other mechanisms of the mindfulness - empathic concern relation that future research
may explore.
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First, steps taken to disambiguate alpha asymmetry as a putative indicator of empathic
simulation may uncover a key neural mechanism. Second, and as previously mentioned,
mindfulness may conduce to empathic concern through emotion regulation processes, in which
one’s own vicarious emotional distress is tempered (Quaglia et al., 2014, 2015) – a necessary
precondition to promoting empathic concern (Decety & Jackson, 2006; see Batson et al., 2015;
Haidt, 2003 for review). Mindfulness training is considered part of a family of meditation
practices that promote emotion regulation (Tang, Hölzel, & Posner, 2015), and many of the
benefits of mindfulness practice are believed to be underlain by these emotion regulatory
advantages (Arch & Landy, 2015; Hölzel et al., 2011). Third, mindfulness may increase the
perceived similarity between self and other (DeSteno, 2016); as noted, perceiving likeness
between the self and other is vital in the promotion of empathy (Cialdini et al., 1997; Decety &
Chaminade, 2003; Trivers, 1971). Fourth, mindfulness may promote empathic concern via
temporary suspension of automatic biases (Kang et al., 2013; Lueke & Gibson, 2014) that can
attenuate kindness toward outgroup members (Stepanikova et al., 2011).
It is unclear why trait mindfulness was not associated with empathic concern. Berry,
Cairo, et al., (2017) found that meta-analyzing relations between trait mindfulness and prosocial
responsiveness (including measures of empathy) toward ostracized strangers revealed unstable
effect sizes, that could have been due to chance. More research with larger sample sizes is
needed to find a more precise range of parameter estimates of the trait mindfulness – empathy
relation, as it may be dependent on as-yet unmeasured factors or may not exist at all.
Mindfulness training increases post-intervention scenario-based helping behavior
but not daily helping behavior. Previous research has shown that weeks-long mindfulness
training can increase objective helping behavior toward an individual in need (Condon et al.,
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2013; Lim et al., 2015), and the present study extended these findings by showing that even brief
mindfulness training increased post-intervention helping frequency in a staged scenario.
Convergent with this finding was evidence that trait mindfulness was associated with more
frequent helping, even after controlling for traits associated with helping behavior. As
previously discussed, mindfulness training concerns a comparatively less conceptually engaged
attention to pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral states (Brown et al., 2007; Olendski, 2005). As
such, one may be more acutely attentive to and aware of one’s own emotional states (Davidson
& Harrington, 2002; Dambrun & Ricard, 2011; Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011;), and those of
others (Bolz & Singer, 2015; Gyatso, 1995; Trautwein, Nanjo, & Schmidt, 2014). Additional
analyses, not reported here, showed that all participants in the study acknowledged the person in
need of help by looking at them or engaging them in conversation. Thus, a lack of helping was
not due to failure to notice the person. Yet noticing did not always result in help, and in fact,
there was one instance where the confederate on crutches accidentally tripped and fell coming
into the room; the participant started a conversation with them, but did not offer them their seat.
The fact that mindfulness training did not increase post-intervention day-to-day helping
was unexpected. This finding is inconsistent with previous research using lab-based helping
scenarios (Berry, Brown, et al., 2017; Berry, Cairo, et al., 2017; Cameron & Fredrick, 2015;
Condon, et al., 213; Lim et al., 2015). But what this measure lacks that measures in previous lab
research possess are clear signals of suffering in the potential helpee. For example, in this study,
helping behaviors included holding doors, picking up fallen items, and giving money, few of
which were unlikely to be accompanied by a person’s distress. A person dropping their wallet
on the ground may suffer later when they realize they cannot find it, but immediately there is no
apparent distress. While these behaviors are indeed helpful brief mindfulness training, like that
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studied here, may require distress signals for helping to occur. What is unclear, then, is why trait
mindfulness was positively associated with pre-intervention daily helping in the present study.
Trained and trait mindfulness may converge and diverge in some aspects of construct validity.
Condon (2017) suggested that training in mindfulness includes implicit ethical instruction (also
see Bodhi, 2011), “through language encouraging a ‘non-judgmental’ and ‘accepting’
approaches to negative emotion” (p. 6). Mindfulness, as measured by the Mindful Attention
Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003), taps present-centered attention and awareness, for
which non-judgment and acceptance may be outgrowths (Brown et al., 2011). But there have
been concerns about the construct validity of trait mindfulness measures, as they do not capture
the ethical dimension that often accompanies mindfulness training and its resultant expression in
daily life (Grossman, 2011). Thus, I conjecture that trait mindfulness, as measured in this study,
may include a more general attentiveness to internal and external stimuli that helps to cue people
to others’ predicaments. Similarly, brief mindfulness training may only increase attentiveness to
the immediate distress of others. This is speculative, of course, but could be tested in the future
using scenario-based helping outcomes wherein distress (vs. no distress) is a between subjects
characteristic; in this way, the specificity of mindfulness training effects could be investigated.
The unexpected importance of empathic fantasy in helping behavior. It was
expected that perspective taking and empathic concern would be associated with helping
behavior, as these relations have been shown in previous research (Calro et al., 1991). It was
unexpected, however, that empathic fantasy would be associated with helping behavior.
Empathic fantasy taps individual proclivities to imaginatively place oneself in the feeling states
and actions of fictional characters. One example item from the IRI subscale is exemplary of the
construct; “After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.” A
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recent social neuroscience study found that individuals scoring higher on the fantasy subscale of
the IRI evidenced greater beta frequency oscillations, a measure of distress reactivity, to
outgroup members in pain. These results may be consistent with previous research suggesting
that the empathy gap for outgroup members is due to dampened empathic simulation of their
distress (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). However, it should be noted that individuals higher in fantasy
showed an exaggerated empathy gap; that is, higher fantasy scores were associated with more
frequent ingroup helping relative to outgroup helping. When tailoring interventions to lessen the
empathy gap, researchers ought to be cognizant of the dispositional tendencies that may change
as a consequence of the intervention, and based on the findings here, training that involves taking
the perspectives of fictional characters may compound the empathy gap.
Limitations
The target sample size (to achieve power of 0.80) was 80, but participant attrition
dropped the sample size to N = 77 after session cancellations and participant suspicion regarding
study hypotheses. Thus, this study may have been slightly underpowered to find effects or
relations that would exist with larger samples.
Generalizability of the empathic simulation findings outside of video observation are
unknown. However, inclusion of staged in vivo measures of helping behavior provided an
ecologically valid metric for prosocial responsiveness. Furthermore, it could be argued that the
pervasiveness of distress-related content in various media sources (e.g., appeals to help refugees
or starving children) provides an ecological exemplar to which these effects can be generalized.
Further examining relations between these measures could reveal more about the link between
emotional responsiveness to suffering and helping. This study was not ideal for testing such
questions as the distress contexts in video and in vivo stimuli were different (i.e., sadness vs.
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discomfort and frustration). Another possible solution to this apparent mismatch between video
and in vivo stimuli would include querying about helpee distress in end-of-day measures of daily
helping.
Also, to my knowledge there are no studies that have explored whether event sampling of
helping behavior (capturing salient behavioral events as they happen) can be used. Such a design
would reduce retrospective memory bias concerns about the end-of-day recording. Perhaps the
addition of pleasant and antagonistic behaviors, as was done in this study, would allow
researchers to use event sampling without creating unintentional demand on participants to
unnaturally seek out opportunities to help.
There are additional limitations to the end-of-day helping checklist used here. First, the
items on the daily helping checklist were not randomized, and participants may have
unintentionally believed that information ordered first was more important (Krosnick, Li, &
Lehman, 1990). Second, the 21-item checklist may have contributed to floor effects on the
outcome due to increased cognitive load (Schwarz, 1996). Future research could benefit from
using a shorter checklist that excludes infrequent helping behaviors and that randomizes the
presentation of help behavior items to avoid such measurement error issues. Third, the low
frequency of helping, which was more than ten times less frequent than expected, could be due to
a variety of factors. For example, females graduate students may have less opportunity to help
outside of work contexts; and participants in this study reporting living in less
sociodemographically diverse areas of the Richmond, Virginia community.
The study sample was quite homogenous, including only self-identifying White women,
most of whom were graduate students. This approach to participant recruitment was taken for
gender-related self-presentation concerns. Including male participants would have created a
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second ingroup/outgroup factor based on gender, thereby weakening study power to detect
training effects and trait relations. This sample was not ideal for other reasons as well. Women
are more likely than men to shift attitudes toward the perceived attitudes of others (Sinclair,
Lowery, Hardin, & Colengelo, 2005), and race-egalitarian attitudes among White individuals are
more commonly endorsed in the presence of Black individuals (e.g., Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair,
2001). Thus, there could have been floor effects among the Women in this study sample, where
insufficient ingroup/outgroup bias existed at baseline. Stated differently, men may benefit more
from mindfulness training in regard to intergroup empathy, as they commonly have higher levels
of racism to attenuate that appear less mutable to the attitudes of social interaction partners
(Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colengelo, 2005).
Including measures of self-reported racism and social dominance orientation was
necessary for validation of outcome measures, but also presented a risk, as White individuals
may experience stereotype threat when primed with the measures (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes,
2008). This stereotype threat could lead individuals to enact socially desirable behaviors so as
not to appear racist – namely, reporting higher levels of empathy or helping racial outgroup
members. Items from these measures were combined with additional measures consistent with
the study’s cover story, and were measured on day eight of the first assessment of daily helping
so as to reduce cueing participants in to study hypotheses concerning race. No participants
indicated suspicion over these questions at post-experimental inquiry, but lack of awareness and
misattribution of the downstream effects of a prime to volition are how primes are effective in
altering behavior to begin with (Loersch & Payne, 2011). Thus, it is unclear in the present study
whether inclusion of trait measures tapping racism and related constructs may have primed
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subsequent helping behaviors, but this was not a demand characteristic specific to either training
condition.
Another study limitation concerns the reliance upon Black female confederates in the
helping scenarios. Most individuals belong to manifold social categories simultaneously (e.g.,
socioeconomic status, sex, skin tone), many of which were held constant or not measured in this
study. Thus, helping responses in the scenarios could also be predicted by whatever social
category was most immediately salient to the participant (Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Also
of importance are the sociodemographic characteristics of the bystanders in the helping
scenarios. Although several decades of research on the effects of the presence of bystanders
exists (Latané & Nida, 1981), to my knowledge no research has addressed the characteristics of
the bystanders as predictors of helping. For example, it is possible that participants would have
deemed Black bystanders as more responsible for helping a Black individual in distress than the
White bystanders that were present in the scenarios in this study.
Concluding Remarks and Implications of Mindfulness for Outgroup Prosociality
This dissertation was designed to examine whether mindfulness training increases
empathic simulation and helping behavior toward racial outgroup members. While mindfulness
training did not increase empathic simulation, it did increase empathic concern and in vivo
prosocial action toward racial outgroup members. These findings are an important step in
understanding the benefits of mindful attention for interracial kindness. This research offers
some support to the contention that mindfulness training may thin boundaries between self and
other in intergroup contexts, but what remains to be answered is how mindfulness achieves this.
This research also extends previous work by showing that mindfulness can promote positive
interpersonal outcomes. Mindfulness may present an effective means to shrink the social gaps
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that divide us and help to drive social discord. These potential benefits notwithstanding, it
should be noted that in today’s world, many social issues are underlain by inequality, and when
individuals in advantaged groups empathize with members of disadvantage groups they do not
engage in behaviors to repair this inequality because they feel like they have already “done
something” by showing empathy (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012). More research is needed in this area
to understand the basic mechanisms of mindfulness in intergroup prosociality so as to better
tailor the application of mindfulness training to current social issues.
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Appendix A
Graduate and Staff Listserv Recruitment Email
Subject: Free Mindfulness Meditation Training + $ Compensation: Participants Needed
The Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) Stress Reduction and Well-Being Study is
seeking individuals who meet the following criteria:
• Between 18 and 60 years of age
• Own a smartphone or personal computer
• Interested in learning mindfulness meditation (4 brief weekday sessions)
• Not meditated previously (yoga is ok)
Qualifying participants have a chance to receive up to $110 in compensation, in addition to free
mindfulness meditation training.
For more information, please contact: vcuwellbeing@gmail.com
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Appendix B
Email Screening Questions
MEDICAL HISTORY INFORMATION FORM
Section 1
Please indicate if you currently or in the past have experienced any of the following:
(If you check yes, state when)
When
I. Neurological conditions:
____Epilepsy
____Head injury
____Hemorrhage
____Meningitis
____Migraine
____Multiple Sclerosis
____Parkinson’s
____Seizures
____Stroke
____Shingles
____Postherapeutic neuralgia
____Other

________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

II. Have you ever undergone any form of brain surgery?
Yes

No

III. Are you currently taking any medications for a problem associated with a neurological condition,
attention-related condition, or mental health condition?
Yes

No

IV. Do you currently have problems with alcohol or drugs (excluding tobacco or social use of alcohol)?
Yes

No

V. Are you currently in treatment for alcohol or drug use?
Yes

No

VI. Are you currently being treated for a psychological or psychiatric condition?
Yes

No

VII. Have you ever experienced brain trauma (e.g., an accident that left you unconscious for more than 10
minutes)?
Yes

No
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VIII. Have you experienced a traumatic or major aversive life event over the last six months?
Yes

No

Section 2
I. Demographics and Additional Exclusion Criteria:
1. What race / ethnicity to you self-identify with?
2. Do you own a smartphone?
3. If yes to 2: What type of operating platform does the phone use?
4. If no to 2: Do you own a PC?
5. What is your age in years?
6. Have you ever practiced meditation before?
7. If yes to 6: What type of meditation did you practice?
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Appendix C
Pilot Study: Do Helper Dispositional Mindfulness and Helpee Race Predict Helping
Frequency?
Research indicates that helping behavior is less frequent in interracial contexts (Cikara et
al., 2011; Saucier et al., 2005; Zaki & Cikara, 2015). As suggested by aversive racism theory
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), self-identifying White individuals are motivated to appear
egalitarian, and will often behave prosocially toward racial outgroup members to maintain this
appearance. However, when reasons unassociated with racism provide an opportunity for Whites
to rationalize not helping - for example by putting oneself in danger - interracial helping is less
frequent than same-race helping (Saucier et al., 2005). The aims of this pilot study were twofold. First, no studies to date had examined whether helping frequency is mutable to the race of
the helpee in the two scenarios proposed in this dissertation project (Condon et al., 2013; Latané
& Dabbs, 1975). More specifically, do Whites provide less frequent help to Black individuals in
need, relative to White individuals in need? Because helping Black individuals is less frequent in
contexts where White individuals can rationalize not helping, this pilot study (and the proposed
project) included bystanders who appeared aloof to the person in need. The number of
bystanders and the presence of aloofness among bystanders have been identified as factors that
reduce helping behavior in general (Darley & Latané, 1968) and have been identified as
rationalizations for not helping in interracial interactions (Saucier et al., 2005). The first aim of
this study was to examine if differences could found in helping same-race and other-race
confederates in these scenarios. And if race helping differences were found, then only using
other-race confederates in the RCT will be justifiable and will preserve statistical power so as not
to include race of the confederate as a between-subjects factor. Second, I aimed to understand the
role of dispositional mindfulness, constructed as both an inherent capacity and an outgrowth of
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MT (Quaglia, Braun, Freeman, McDaniel, Brown 2016), and racial prejudice in predicting
helping frequency. Previous studies show that MT increases laboratory-based helping frequency
(Condon et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2015), but none have examined this relation in interracial
contexts or in one of the proposed scenarios.
Berry, Brown, Cairo, Wall, et al. (2016) recruited 139 self-identifying White or
Caucasian undergraduate participants in exchange for course credit. Participants were
randomized to receive one of the two following scenarios: (1) an experimenter ostensibly
accidentally dropped a large stack of informed consent documents on the floor (modified from
Latané & Dabbs, 1975), or (2) another ostensible participant walked into the waiting room on
crutches and leaned uncomfortably against the wall (cf., Condon et al., 2013). The race of the
confederate needing help (White or Black) was also randomized. Thereafter participants
completed a series of self-report measures, including a commonly used measure of basic
dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003), a measure of trait agreeableness (Costa &
McCrae, 1992), a measure of trait empathy (Davis, 1983), and a measure of racial prejudice
toward Black individuals (Henry & Sears, 2002).
Preliminary multiple logistic regression models showed that there were no differences in
the frequency of helping same race (coded as 0) vs. other race (coded as 1) confederates in need
[b = 0.55, SE(b) = 0.37, OR = 1.73, 95% CI = (0.83, 3.59)] nor were there differences in the
frequency of helping in the crutches (coded as 0) vs. paper-dropping (coded as 1) scenarios [b =
0.31, SE(b) = 0.37, OR = 1.36, 95% CI = (0.66, 2.80)]. Table 1 shows results from a three-block
hierarchical logistic regression that tested whether participant sex (male = 0, female = 1), trait
mindfulness, agreeableness, and racism, and mindfulness x racism interaction predicted helping
behavior (yes, no). Initial tests of this model included helping recipient race, and scenario type,
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but were not included in the subsequent model that is presented in Table 14 for parsimonious
presentation of study effects. Males showed more frequent helping behavior frequencies than
females, and higher agreeableness scores were associated with more frequent helping of same
and other race individuals in need. Most importantly, higher dispositional mindfulness scores
predicted more frequent helping of same and other race individuals in need. In addition to this
significant main effect, a significant mindfulness x racial prejudice interaction was found.
Table 14. Hierarchical logistic regression results showing prediction of helping behavior across
confederate race conditions and scenarios (Pilot study).
Block

Predictor

B

SE(b)

OR

[95% CI]

1

Participant Sex

-1.309*

.510

.270

[.099, .734]

Agreeableness

1.026**

.371

2.791

[1.348, 5.777]

Racial Prejudice

.14

.345

1.151

[.585, 2.263]

2

Mindfulness

1.167***

.316

3.213

[1.730, 5.965]

3

Mindfulness x Racial

1.497*

.639

4.467

[1.277, 15.630]

Prejudice
Notes. **p < .01, ***p < .001.
To decompose the significant mindfulness x racial prejudice interaction, four two-block
hierarchical logistic regression analyses were constructed. Participant sex and agreeableness
were loaded into block 1. Mindfulness was loaded into block 2. Median splits were performed on
the racial prejudice and trait mindfulness variables. These two-level racial prejudice and
mindfulness factors, and the race of the confederate were predictors of the binary helping
outcome decomposition of the significant interaction effect. Thus, as depicted in Figure 10,
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models were constructed for (1) low racism individuals toward Whites, (2) low racism
individuals toward Blacks, (3) high racism individuals toward Whites, and (4) high racism
individuals toward blacks. Results showed that racism qualified the relation between mindfulness
and helping, such that individuals higher in racism helped more frequently if they were also high
in mindfulness. Individuals lower in racism were also more helpful if they were higher in
mindfulness, but this relation was not as strong as it was for individuals higher in racism.
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Figure 10. Trait mindfulness relations to helping behavior split by race of the person in need and median splits of racial prejudice and
mindfulness scores.
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Appendix D
Informed Consent
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM
TITLE: Meditation and Psychological / Neural Responses in Social Interaction
VCU IRB NO.:
This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask the study staff to
explain any words that you do not clearly understand. You may take home an unsigned copy of
this consent form to think about or discuss with family or friends before making your decision.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study seeks to understand how meditation is associated with psychological and neural
responses during social interactions. You are being asked to participate in this study because you
are an adult residing in the Richmond community between the ages of 18 and 60 years. The
research study will be conducted in seven laboratory sessions lasting approximately 30 minutes
to 2 hours in duration. There is compensation available for your participation, and you will
receive a free 4-day course in mindfulness meditation. Participation is voluntary, and all
responses will remain strictly confidential.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT
If you decide to be in this research study, you will first be asked to sign this consent form after
you have had all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you. In the first
laboratory session, you will be asked to complete a series of psychological questionnaires that
ask about various experiences you may have. After this, you will receive training on diary
questionnaires that you will answer each night for fourteen days (two weeks) on your own time
using your personal smartphone or computer.
In the second laboratory session, you will be asked to complete a computer task while
neurological recordings are made. We will be using an EEG recording in this study, which is a
non-invasive procedure that is painless.
Thereafter, you will participate in four consecutive days of one of two sitting meditation classes.
Classes will take place in the evening, and last approximately 30 minutes. The sitting meditation
will be guided by an experienced practitioner, who will teach you gentle exercises that focus
your attention on your breath and other experiences while you are seated. After the exercise is
finished there will be time for questions and answers.
In the final laboratory session, you will complete a computer task while EEG recordings are
made, and receive a second training session on the diary questionnaire protocol. You will
complete another fourteen days of diary questionnaires each night on your own time using your
personal smartphone or computer.
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This study will take a 5-week time commitment, though you will only spend a few minutes on
most days devoted to this study. Please note that laboratory sessions will require a greater time
commitment of 30 minutes to 2 hours. You do not have to answer any questions or participate in
any activities you do not wish to. You may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
All of your data will be kept strictly confidential and will be viewed by the research study
personnel only. We plan to enroll up to 120 adults from the Richmond community in our study.
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The physical risks involved in this study are minimal and are related to the neurological
recordings – specifically, wearing an EEG sensor cap. The sensor cap fits snugly on the head like
a swim cap and is embedded with sensors that detect electrical brain activity on the surface of the
scalp. The cap does not alter brain activity in any way; it simply detects electrical activity in the
brain. This equipment has been used extensively and safely with healthy adults in previous
research.
The risks to participating are not greater than the risks associated with daily living. However, if
participating in this study causes you to feel upset or you become concerned about your
psychological state or your current life situation, the study staff will provide you with contact
information for resources available on campus that can help you address these issues, including:
•
•
•

University Counseling Services, which offers free counseling for VCU students; phone 8286200 (Monroe Park Campus) or 828-3964 (Medical Campus).
University Student Health Services (also free for VCU students); phone 828-8828 (Monroe
Park Campus) or 828-9220 (Medical Campus).
Center for Psychological Services and Development, which offers counseling services on a
sliding fee scale; phone 828-8069.

Should you need services other than those provided by VCU University Counseling Services or
University Student Health Services, fees for such treatment will be billed to you or to appropriate
third party insurance.
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS
We do not anticipate that you will receive any direct benefit from this study. However, others
may benefit from your participation in that the information we learn from people in this study
may help us better understand the processes under study.
COSTS
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend on the tasks
and filling out questionnaires.
ALTERNATIVES
The alternative to participating in this study is to not participate.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The data collected in this study will not be personally identifiable, as no name or other
potentially identifiable information will be associated with the data. We will not put your name
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on any documents or forms that we collect. Data is being collected only for research purposes,
identified only by an anonymous study ID number, and stored separately from the consent form
in a locked research area. All information will be kept in password protected electronic files.
Hard copy questionnaires will be kept in a locked file cabinet for 3 years after the study ends and
will be destroyed at that time. Electronic files of the study data will be kept indefinitely. Access
to all data will be limited to study personnel. A data and safety monitoring plan is established.
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us; however, information from the study and the
consent form signed by you may be looked at or copied for research or legal purposes by the
sponsor of the research, or by Virginia Commonwealth University. Personal information about
you might be shared with or copied by authorized officials of the Federal Food and Drug
Administration, or the Department of Health and Human Services (if applicable). What we find
from this study may be presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever
be used in these presentations or papers.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any
time without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked
in the study. Withdrawal from the study will not affect you present or future University
relationship.
Your participation in this study may be stopped at any time by the study staff without your
consent. The reasons might include:
• the study staff thinks it necessary for your health or safety;
• you have not followed study instructions;
• administrative reasons require your withdrawal.
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QUESTIONS
In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have any
questions, complaints, or concerns about the research, contact:
Kirk Warren Brown, PhD
Virginia Commonwealth University
Department of Psychology
806 W. Franklin Street
P.O. Box 982018
Richmond, VA 23284
Telephone: 804-828-6754
The researcher named above is the best person to call for questions about your participation in
this study.
If you have any general questions about your rights as a participant in this or any other research,
you may contact:
Office of Research
Virginia Commonwealth University
800 East Leigh Street, Suite 3000
P.O. Box 980568
Richmond, VA 23298
Telephone: (804) 827-2157
You may also contact this number for general questions, concerns or complaints about the
research. Please call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk to
someone else. Additional information about participation in research studies can be found at
http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/volunteers.htm.
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CONSENT
I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information about this
study. Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My signature says that
I am willing to participate in this study. I will receive a copy of the consent form once I have
agreed to participate.

Participant name printed

Participant signature

Date

________________________________________________
Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent/Witness (Printed)

________________________________________________ ________________
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent/Witness
Date

________________________________________________ ________________
Investigator Signature (if different from above)
Date
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Appendix E
Sadness Video Stimuli Creation and Validation
Stimuli creation. Eighteen female undergraduate students were recruited from a 200level psychology course at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) to participate in video
stimulus creation in exchange for course credit. Each amateur “actress” reported individually to a
recording studio on the Monroe Park Campus of VCU, and prior to video recording participants
signed a video release form. Professional lighting was used and the videos were directed by a
professional videographer, an alumnus from the VCU School of the Arts. Actresses were
instructed to think about a sad time in their life that they could remember vividly, and were
instructed to practice facial (i.e., oblique eyebrows; Eisenberg, McCreath, & Ahn, 1988; Ekman
& Friesen, 1982), postural, and behavioral (e.g., slumped posture, head in hands, looking down;
Adams & Kleck, 2005; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987) expressions of sadness.
The actresses practiced emoting while video was recorded; this author and the videographer
provided feedback to each actress, and actresses were shown the video so as to modify their
behaviors and facial expressions for more genuine expression of sadness if necessary. Then,
three to five 45-second to 60-second videos were recorded of each actress while she emoted.
Three-tiered analytic strategy for video validation. Four actresses were excluded from
analyses for self-identifying with a race other than White or Black, leaving 51 videos depicting
14 actresses. A three-round analytic approach was adopted to validate the video stimuli. First, 22
of the 51 videos were removed from subsequent video analyses for lack of 20 continuous
seconds of genuine sadness expression (visually inspected by this author and the videographer),
leaving 29 videos depicting 14 unique actresses. During the second round of video validation, 15
undergraduate research assistants reported to a lab room on the Monroe Park Campus in groups
of 2 to 6 individuals and performed self-report ratings of the video stimuli. The 29 video stimuli
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were presented with MediaLab (Jarvis, 2012), and during video observation raters made
continuous scale ratings anchored by 5 text labels (‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’) for the following
emotions: sadness, guilt, fatigue, anger, and fear. Continuous ratings were performed with a
slider scale that allowed raters to move the slider with the left and right arrow keys on the
keyboard; there were three incremental stopping points between each of the five text anchors on
the scale. MediaLab samples the slider position at a rate of one sample for every 1/10th of a
second. These data are then averaged for each second of ratings, and a second-by-second output
file is created for analysis. Because of the large number of videos, the raters were instructed to
rate no more than two emotions during one session, and thus required a minimum of three
sessions to complete the full emotion set. After continuous rating of each video research
assistants also responded to the following six items using a 5-point Likert scale (cf., Gutsell &
Inzlicht, 2012): (1) “the person in the video felt _________.” (‘very slightly or not at all
positive’ to ‘extremely positive’), (2) “the person in the video felt _________.” (‘very slightly or
not at all negative’ to ‘extremely negative’), (3) “the person in the video experienced a
_________ emotion.” (‘very weak’ to ‘very strong), (4) “the person in the video was________.”
(‘very unlikable’ to ‘very likable’), (5) “the person in the video was________.” (‘very attractive’
to ‘very unattractive’), and (6) “the technical quality of the video was ________.” (‘very poor’
to ‘very good’).
From these 29 videos, 13 were excluded on the basis of significantly lower means,
relative to the other 16 videos, on questions 2 and 3 (n = 10) above, question 5 (n = 2) and in the
emotion adjective ratings, appearing guilty, not sad (n = 1). Twenty-second clips were then used
from the 16 selected videos using video-editing software (Nero Video). These videos were cut
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such that the 20 second increments indicated the greatest average sadness scores in each video,
as measured by continuous ratings of the emotion item sadness during video observation.
The 16 videos selected from round two, which depicted 14 unique individuals, were
piloted in the third round of stimulus validation. Three-hundred sixty-six undergraduate
participants were recruited in exchange for course credit. Upon arriving to a large classroom on
the Monroe Park Campus at VCU, participants gave written informed consent, and were then
shown 9 videos in random order from one of three video orders (see Table 15). Videos were
shown on a large projector screen at the front of the auditorium; sadness scores were compared
within video orders using a repeated-measures ANOVA, and videos that were shown across
multiple groups were compared using one-way ANOVA.
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Table 15. Videos included in each video viewing session.
Video

N

Race

Order 1

Order 2

Order 3

Video 1

214

White

X

X

Video 2

223

White

X

X

Video 3

161

Black

X

Video 4

292

White

X

X

Video 5

261

Black

X

X

Video 6

219

Black

X

Video 7

159

Black

X

Video 8

223

White

X

X

Video 9

203

Black

X

X

Video 10

240

White

X

X

Video 11

239

Black

X

X

Video 12

199

Black

X

X

Video 13

199

White

X

X

Video 14

185

Black

X

X

Video 15

139

Black

X

Video 16

132

White

X

X

Notes. Videos selected for use as stimuli in future research are bold. X indicates that video was
shown in the video viewing session.

Prior to watching the videos, the lights were dimmed and participants were instructed to
devote their full attention to the projector screen. After each video ended the lights were turned
back on and participants rated 24 adjectives from five subscales, sadness, fatigue, serenity, fear,
and guilt, of the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded form (PANAS-X;
Watson & Clark, 1994). Responses were made on a 5-point Likert scale concerning the extent to
which the person in the video expressed the following emotions or psychological states (‘very
slightly or not at all’ to ‘extremely’). The six items used in the second tier of analysis (described
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above) were also completed after each video. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed
on the 24 PANAS-X items for each video separately. During factor extraction, an oblique
rotation was used and factor loadings were examined in pattern matrices and structure matrices.
Videos were not used in the present study if, first, non-sadness items cross-loaded onto the
sadness factor (factor loading cutoff ≤ 0.30). Sadness was found to be a unique factor with no
cross-loadings across all 16 videos. An example factor structure matrix for one of the 16 videos
is depicted in Table 16. Second, videos with statistically lower or higher sadness mean scores,
assessed with post-hoc analyses using Bonferonni correction, were also removed. Table 17
depicts statistical analytic results for removal of 4 video stimuli, leaving a total of 12 videos for
use in the dissertation study.
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Table 16. Factor structure matrix of video 1 emotions.
Emotion

Guilt

Sadness

Fatigue

Serenity

Drowsy

−0.01

0.04

−0.00

0.78

0.07

Sleepy

−0.01

0.14

0.12

0.71

−0.21

Sluggish

−0.01

0.03

0.11

0.68

0.09

Tired

−0.00

0.22

0.28

0.61

0.19

Afraid

0.13

0.34

0.07

0.16

0.12

Frightened

0.23

0.80

0.14

0.11

−0.00

Jittery

0.13

0.81

0.13

0.06

−0.02

Nervous

0.08

0.66

0.17

0.05

−0.02

Scared

0.28

0.58

0.05

0.15

0.09

Shaky

0.11

0.48

0.03

0.14

−0.11

Angry at Self

0.59

0.23

0.15

−0.05

−0.02

Ashamed

0.72

0.11

0.30

-0.07

0.04

Blameworthy

0.71

0.12

0.08

0.02

0.03

Disgusted with Self

0.78

0.16

0.22

0.01

−0.00

Dissatisfied with Self

0.60

0.07

0.15

−0.13

0.02

Guilty

0.75

0.13

0.08

0.10

−0.03

Alone

0.09

0.25

0.68

0.16

0.04

Blue

0.16

−0.00

0.64

0.04

0.10

Downhearted

0.12

0.01

0.56

−0.05

−0.08

Lonely

0.14

0.12

0.58

0.24

0.03

Sad

0.25

0.11

0.57

0.10

0.02

−0.02

0.10

0.04

0.11

0.40

Calm

0.01

0.03

0.03

0.19

0.68

Relaxed

0.02

−0.13

0.00

−0.03

0.41

Eigenvalue

5.90

2.92

2.14

1.68

1.24

% Variance

24.59

12.15

8.93

6.99

5.16

At Ease

Fear

Notes. Factor loadings > 0.30 are bold.
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Table 17. One-way and repeated-measures ANOVAS used to remove videos from the present study’s stimulus set.
Order

V1 M

V2 M

V3 M

V4 M

V5 M

V6 M

V7 M

V8 M

V9 M

Order 1

3.69

3.39

2.15

3.39

3.27

3.12

2.54

3.70

3.25

3.57

3.39

Order 2
Order 3

3.82

3.51

F

0.25ns

0.00ns

0.70ns

0.07ns

V10 M

V11 M

V12 M

V13 M

V14 M

3.29

3.29

3.11

3.23

3.17

3.37

3.53

3.07

3.40

3.34

3.25

3.40

3.53

0.08ns

1.58ns

0.66ns

0.38ns

0.44ns

0.56ns

1.11ns

5.48*

V15 M

2.57

V16 M

2.45

F all

F drop

4.29*

2.32ns

7.36*

1.67ns

2.32ns

Notes. Videos removed from the present study’s stimulus set are bold; F all = test statistic including all videos in a viewing order; F
drop = test statistic after removing videos with statistically different mean sadness scores from analysis.
*p < .05, nsp > 0.05
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Appendix F
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale

Day-to-Day Experiences
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using the 1-6
scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each experience.
Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than what you think your
experience should be. Please treat each item separately from every other item.
1
Almost
Always

2
Very
Frequently

3
Somewhat
Frequently

4
Somewhat
Infrequently

5
Very
Infrequently

6
Almost
Never

I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of
it until some time later.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying
attention, or thinking of something else.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying
attention to what I experience along the way.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort
until they really grab my attention.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it
for the first time.

1 2 3 4

5 6

It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness
of what I’m doing.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch
with what I’m doing right now to get there.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what
I'm doing.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing
something else at the same time.

1 2 3 4

5
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6

1
Almost
Always

2
Very
Frequently

3
Somewhat
Frequently

4
Somewhat
Infrequently

5
Very
Infrequently

6
Almost
Never

I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went
there.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I find myself doing things without paying attention.

1 2 3 4

5 6

I snack without being aware that I’m eating.

1 2 3 4

5
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Appendix G
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
IRI
Instructions: The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on
the scale at the top of the page: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. When you have decided on your answer, fill in the
letter on the answer sheet next to the item number. READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY
BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank you.
ANSWER SCALE
Does Not
Describe Me
Well
1

Describes Me
Very Well
2

3

4

5

____1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.
____2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
____3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
____4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
____5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
____6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
____7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely
caught up in it.
____8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
____9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
____10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.
____11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.
____12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
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ANSWER SCALE
Does Not
Describe Me
Well
1

Describes Me
Very Well
2

3

4

5

____13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
____14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
____15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's
arguments.
____16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
____17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
____18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for
them.
____19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.
____20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
____21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
____22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
____23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading
character.
____24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
____25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
____26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
events in the story were happening to me.
____27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
____28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
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Appendix H
NEO-Five Factor Inventory: Agreeableness Subscale
Instructions: Please read each of the following statements carefully. Using the 0 to 4 scale
below, indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement.
Strongly
Disagree
0

Disagree
1

Neither Disagree
nor Agree
2

Agree
3

____1. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet.
____2. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers.
____3. Some people think I'm selfish and egotistical.
____4. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them.
____5. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of other's intentions.
____6. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let them.
____7. Most people I know like me.
____8. Some people think of me as cold and calculating.
____9. I am hardheaded and tough-minded in my attitudes.
____10. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate.
____11. If I don't like people, I let them know it.
____12. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want.
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Strongly
Agree
4

Appendix I
Modern Racism Scale
Perceptions of Social Groups
Instructions: The following statements ask about feelings toward social groups and social
issues. Please indicate your feelings by endorsing the scale below each question. There are no
right or wrong answers to these questions; please select the answer that best reflects your
opinion.
1. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder
they would be just as well off as whites.
Strongly Agree
1

Somewhat Agree
2

Somewhat Disagree
3

Strongly Disagree
4

2. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same.
Strongly Agree
1

Somewhat Agree
2

Somewhat Disagree
3

Strongly Disagree
4

3. Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they
haven’t pushed fast enough. What do you think?
Trying to push too fast
1

Going too slowly
2

Moving at the right speed
3

4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks
are responsible for creating?
All of it
1

Most
2

Some
3

Not much at all
4

5. How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today,
limiting their chances to get ahead.
A lot
1

Some
2

A little
3
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None at all
4

6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult
for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
Strongly Agree
1

Somewhat Agree
2

Somewhat Disagree
3

Strongly Disagree
4

7. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
Strongly Agree
1

Somewhat Agree
2

Somewhat Disagree
3

Strongly Disagree
4

8. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
Strongly Agree
1

Somewhat Agree
2

Somewhat Disagree
3
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Strongly Disagree
4

Appendix J
Social Dominance Orientation Scale
Instructions: Please read each of the following statements carefully. Using the 1 to 7 scale
below, indicate the extent to which you positive or negative about the statement.
Very
Negative

Negative

A Little
Negative

1

2

3

Neither
Positive
nor
Negative
4

A Little
Positive

Positive

Very
Positive

5

6

7

____1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
____2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
____3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
____4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
____5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
____6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom.
____7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
____8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
____9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
____10. Group equality should be our ideal.
____11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
____12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
____13. Increased social equality.
____14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
____15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
____16. No one group should dominate in society
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Appendix K
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Empathic Sadness Scales
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions.
For each item, indicate TO WHAT EXTENT YOU WERE FEELING THIS WAY WHILE
WATCHING THE VIDEO. Please circle a number for each emotion using the 1 to 5 scale shown
below.
1

2

Not at All

A Little

3

4

5

Moderately

6

7

Quite a Bit

Extremely

sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, and softhearted. Seven adjectives will tap
1. Sympathetic

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. Moved

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Compassionate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Tender

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Warm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Softhearted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. Alarmed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. Upset

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. Worried

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. Disturbed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. Perturbed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. Distressed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. Troubled

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. Sad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. Dejected

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. Sorrowful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. Low-spirited

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

154

1

2

Not at All

A Little

3

4

5

Moderately

18. Downhearted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. Heavy-hearted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. Feeling Low

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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6

7

Quite a Bit

Extremely

Appendix L
Video Validation Ratings for Tier 3
Video 1 Emotions
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions.
For each item, indicate TO WHAT EXTENT YOU BELIEVE THE PERSON IN THE
VIDEO YOU JUST WATCHED IS FEELING THIS WAY. Please circle a number for each
emotion using the 1 to 5 scale shown below.
1
Very Slightly or
Not At All

2

3

4

5

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

1. Sleepy

1

2

3

4

5

2. Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

3. Tired

1

2

3

4

5

4. Sad

1

2

3

4

5

5. Sluggish

1

2

3

4

5

6. Afraid

1

2

3

4

5

7. Calm

1

2

3

4

5

8. Scared

1

2

3

4

5

9. Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

10. Relaxed

1

2

3

4

5

11. Blue

1

2

3

4

5

12. Downhearted

1

2

3

4

5

13. At ease

1

2

3

4

5

14. Blameworthy

1

2

3

4

5

15. Frightened

1

2

3

4

5

16. Nervous

1

2

3

4

5
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1
Very Slightly or
Not At All

2

3

4

5

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

17. Alone

1

2

3

4

5

18. Jittery

1

2

3

4

5

19. Angry at self

1

2

3

4

5

20. Lonely

1

2

3

4

5

21. Disgusted with self

1

2

3

4

5

22. Drowsy

1

2

3

4

5

23. Shaky

1

2

3

4

5

24. Dissatisfied with self

1

2

3

4

5

VIDEO 1 RATINGS CONTINUED
The following questions pertain to the video you just watched. Please circle a number for each
question using the scale provided below the question.
1. The person in the video felt __________.
1
2
3
Very Slightly or
A Little
Moderately
Not At All
Positive
Positive
Positive

4
Quite a Bit
Positive

5
Extremely
Positive

4
Quite a Bit
Negative

5
Extremely
Negative

1
Strong

2
Very Strong

2. The person in the video felt __________.
1
Very Slightly or
Not At All
Negative

2
A Little
Negative

3
Moderately
Negative

3. The person in the video experienced a __________ emotion.
-2
Very Weak

-1
Weak

0
Neither Weak
nor Strong

4. I thought the person in the video was __________.
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-2
Very Unlikable

-1
Unlikable

0
Neither
Unlikable nor
Likable

1
Likable

2
Very Likable

1
Attractive

2
Very Attractive

1
Good

2
Very Good

5. I thought the person in the video was __________.
-2
Very
Unattractive

-1
Unattractive

0
Neither
Unattractive nor
Attractive

6. I thought the video quality was _________.
-2
Very Poor

-1
Poor

0
Neither Poor nor
Good

Please wait for further instructions from the experimenter. He or she will begin the next video
momentarily.
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Appendix M
Expected Benefits of Intervention Questionnaire
COURSE EVALUATION FORM
Instructions: We would like you to indicate below how much you believe, right now, that the
course you will receive will help to reduce your stress. Belief usually has two aspects to it: (1)
what one thinks will happen and (2) what one feels will happen. Sometimes these are similar;
sometimes they are different. Please answer the questions below.
In the first set, answer in terms of what you think. In the second set answer in terms of what you
really and truly feel. Your course leaders will not ever see these ratings, so please be honest in
your responses.
Set I
1. At this point, how logical does the course offered to you seem?
1
Not At
All
Logical

2

3

4

5
Somewhat
Logical

6

7

8

9
Very
Logical

2. At this point, how successfully do you think this course will be in reducing your stress?
1
Not At
All
Useful

2

3

4

5
Somewhat
Useful

6

7

8

9
Very
Useful

3. How confident would you be in recommending this course to a friend who experiences similar
stresses?
1
Not At
All
Confident

2

3

4

5
Somewhat
Confident

6

7

8

9
Very
Confident

4. By the end of this course, how much improvement in your stress do you think will occur?
0
0%

1
10%

2
20%

3
30%

4
40%

5
50%
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6
60%

7
70%

8
80%

9
90%

10
100%

Set II
1. At this point, how much do you really feel this course will help you to reduce your stress?
1
Not At
All

2

3

4

5
Somewhat

6

7

8

9
Very
Much

2. By the end of the course, how much improvement in your stress do you really feel will occur?
0
0%

1
10%

2
20%

3
30%

4
40%

5
50%
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6
60%

7
70%

8
80%

9
90%

10
100%

Appendix N
EMA End-of-day Helping and Empathy Measures
Behavior Checklist
Please check all of the behaviors that you performed today.
 Introduced yourself
 Verbally greeted someone
 Gave directions
 Helped someone with technology
 Delayed an elevator
 Ignored or avoided someone
 Held open a door
 Nonverbally greeted someone (smiled, waved, made eye contact)
 Made change
 Made an aggressive gesture toward someone
 Picked up a fallen object for someone
 Lent or gave money
 Disagreed with someone
 Made conversation
 Helped a disabled or elderly person
 Let someone go ahead of you in line
 Felt good about another person’s misfortune
 Lent an item of value (tools, clothes, car)
 Helped someone with school work
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 Cut a conversation short
 Asked someone if they needed help
For each checked item participants will answer
1. How many times did you perform this behavior today?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
2. Where were you when the interaction took place?
 Work

 Church

 Home

 Gym

 School

 On The Street / Sidewalk

 Traveling

 Restaurant

 Shopping

 Park

 Other
3. What time of day did the interaction take place?  Morning  Afternoon  Evening
4. Please indicate who you interacted with.  Stranger  Acquaintance
5. What do you think was the race of the primary person with whom you interacted?
____ White or Caucasian

____ Filipino

____ Black or Black

____ Japanese

____ Hispanic or Latino(a)

____ Korean

____ Native American

____ Vietnamese

____ Asian Indian

____ Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander

____ Chinese

____ Middle Eastern

____ Multi-Racial (please specify): __________
____ Other (please specify): ____________
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6. What was the sex of the primary person with whom you interacted?  Male  Female
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